



XVII^{ème}

Rencontre Internationale EURODEFENSE
Défense: Politique et Pratique



XVIIth
International Meeting EURODEFENSE
Defence: Political and Practical

Bruxelles, le 20 Octobre 2011

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Abstract

“Defense Cooperation in a European Framework” has been with us ever since the “Treaty of Brussels” created the “West European Union” the 17th of March 1948. That “West European Union” ceased to exist this year 2011.

There was a period of possible great vision when in 1950 the “European Defense Community” was proposed by the French Prime minister René Pleven; this vision disappeared when in 1954 the Parliament in Paris choose not to ratify and also because the United Kingdom never really planned to participate.

For most of the four decades of the Cold War “ Defense Cooperation in a European Framework” remained dormant and that notwithstanding a multitude of bilateral and multilateral cooperation’s among European Nations, but this mainly in a “North Atlantic Treaty Alliance” environment.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disappearance of the Soviet Union the idea of “Defense” is now perceived by many European Nations in a different way: less territorial and heavily linked to the notion of “Security” nationally and internationally .

The “European Economic Community” transformed itself in the “European Union” with the “Treaty of Maastricht” in 1993, and the “Treaty of Lisbon” in 2009 underlined the importance of a “Common Security and Defense Policy”, announcing the creation of appropriate tools.

The world financial crisis starting in 2008 has as one of its consequences an important reduction of the budgets of defense in most of the Nations of the European Union.

An increased ambition in Security and Defense by the European Union on the one hand and drastically decreasing defense budgets in the Nations on the other hand ask for new ideas, new approaches, new initiatives.

This colloquium tried to understand the overall political message in its complexity as it recognizes the importance of an international Union wide approach with at the same time showing respect for pure National considerations. Also it had the ambition to allow a number of collaborative new initiatives in the area of Defense to provide a positive testimony of what can be done in the European environment at this moment, trying to stimulate an inspiring exchange of ideas.

Acknowledgements

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Lay-out: Hugo Van Aelst

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EURODEFENSE participants



EURODEFENSE Presidents and some assistants



With some of the Ladies

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Dr. Minister Werner FASSLABEND

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Dr. Arnold KAMMEL

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Secrétaire Général Colin CAMERON
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Vice-amiral (Ret) Gilles COMBARIEU

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Mr. Jean-François DAVID
Mr. Bernard DENIS
Général Jacques FAVIN LEVEQUE
Mr. Jean MARSIA
Mr. Georges ORDONNAUD
Général (Ret) Jean-Paul PERRUCHÉ
Général (Ret) Jacques PERGET
Mr. Philippe ROGER
Mr. Philippe TENNESON

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Rear Admiral (Ret) Jörk-Eckart RESCHKE, President
Ministerialrat (Ret) Winfried VENTKER, Advocate
Mr. Hartmun BÜHL

Dr. Dieter OSE
Mrs. Gunthild RESCHKE
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Mrs. Ilona KUNOS

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Ambassador (Ret) Pietro CALAMIA, Vice-President

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Ambassadeur (Ret) Edouard MOLITOR

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Mrs. Hanneke van EEKELEN

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General (Ret) Augusto MELO CORREIA, Vice-President
Mr. Miguel FRADIQUE DA SILVA, Secretary General

Mrs. FIGUEIREDO LOPEZ
Mr. Antonio MATEUS DA SILVA
Mrs. MATEUS DA SILVA

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Mr. Antonio NADAL
Mr. Javier RUZ DE OJEDA

**UNITED KINGDOM**

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Colonel MJ ROSE
Mrs. MJ ROSE

Commodore Richard BRIGES
Mrs. Richard BRIGES
Mr. James ELDER

Colonel Corinne Faut



Welcome

With the establishment of the European Security & Defence Policy in 1999, the EU has achieved considerable progress regarding the establishment of its foreign policy.

Ten years of ESDP have led to a number of achievements in the field of security and given rise to the deployment of different missions in many parts of the world.

The PSC – The Permanent Structured Cooperation is one of the key provision included in the Lisbon Treaty. According to the Treaty, the PSC shall be open to any member state that develops its defence capabilities in multinational forces. Participating member states shall be involved in pooling together and harmonizing their security and defence resources.

Deze conferentie heeft de ambitie om terug aan te knopen met de mensen die initiatieven rond Europese defensie zien vanuit de kant van het glas dat half vol is in plaats van half leeg. Het is de bedoeling dat de verschillende uiteenzettingen, zij het vanuit een politiek, militair, strategisch of heel praktisch oogpunt, bijdragen aan het nadenken over en acties voor een meer Europese Defensie.

C'est pourquoi je suis très heureuse qu'EURODEFENSE-Belgique ait demandé à l'Institut de travailler de concert pour organiser la 17ième rencontre internationale EURODEFENSE. Aujourd'hui, la présence de toutes ces délégations nationales de cette organisation est la preuve d'un engagement ferme en faveur de la Défense en Europe. Les origines d'EURODEFENSE remontent à 1993 et ont

pour base différentes associations nationales qui partageaient toutes la même conviction : l'importance d'une solide défense commune en Europe.

Créée en 1994 EURODEFENSE regroupe maintenant treize associations nationales dont le but commun est une coopération européenne bâtissant la voie efficace qui fera de l'Europe un acteur stratégique significatif dans le monde de demain. Les rencontres internationales EURODEFENSE sont un moyen pour l'organisation de coordonner et de promouvoir leur message.



Questions ?

Minister Pieter De Crem



Distinguished members of the international EURODEFENSE community, Admirals, Generals, Excellencies,

Mrs. Director General of the Royal Higher Institute for Defense, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure to address the opening remarks for the XVIIth International EURODEFENSE Meeting held here in Brussels at the Royal Military Academy. Unfortunately my agenda did not allow me to participate in person in this important event, but thanks to the modern technology I should be able to welcome you nevertheless to this conference on the political and practical aspects of the European Union's increased ambition in the field of security and defense.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the international EURODEFENSE community, for its longstanding efforts to contribute to the understanding of the importance of European security and defense cooperation and the possibilities to develop this cooperation in the future. Your explorative think tank activities serve as inspiration for the political and military leadership in Europe.

A few years ago, former Chief of Defense Admiral Willy Herteleer, currently retired but probably still almost as busy as before, took the initiative to establish a Belgian EURODEFENSE Chapter, holding legal personality under Belgian law. In his legendary drive he successfully explored the possibility of hosting an International EURODEFENSE Meeting for the very first time here in Belgium.

The Royal Higher Institute for Defense agreed to partner in this event and this opened the initiative to a much larger participation, which offers even more expertise around the table and more networking opportunities.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

During the Belgian presidency of the European Union in the second half of last year the political leadership in Europe offered the key to a bright future for armed forces in Europe.

Allow me to quote, by way of example, from an article authored by Professor Sven Biscop and published in a Security Policy Brief edited by the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations:

“On 9 December 2010, the Ministers of Defence of the EU agreed on the so-called Ghent Framework, referring to their earlier informal meeting in that city in September. Each EU Member State will analyze its capabilities in order to identify: (1) those it will maintain on a national level; (2) those to which it will contribute through pooling with other Member States; and (3) those to which it will no longer contribute, relying on specialization and role-sharing between Member States. If done in a permanent and structured manner, such a process will lead to true cooperation – as envisaged by Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new defence mechanism in the Lisbon Treaty. The end-result will benefit everybody: more effective forces, no matter how integrated, will be available for national as well as CSDP, NATO and UN operations”.

In a fast-changing world with a growing number of crises, there is a growing demand for the European Union to become a more capable, coherent and strategic global actor. Our defense expenditures have been declining for some time and Europe will have to do more with less. We have to examine all institutional and legal options available to EU Member States, including Permanent Structured Cooperation, to develop critical CSDP capabilities. Pooling and sharing of Europe’s capabilities is a necessity and no longer a mere option. It offers the best solution for getting more from our scarce resources. Now is the time to turn ideas and proposals into new concrete multinational projects, if we want to preserve and develop Europe’s defense capabilities. The European Defence Agency is already helping EU Members States build cost-effective cooperation and information-sharing on possible collaboration remains essential to identify future pooling and sharing projects. We also have to learn from existing cooperation. Indeed, we are able to learn from these experiences and to identify best practices and criteria for success.

In the invitation it was said that this International EURODEFENSE Meeting has the ambition to present a number of new collaborative initiatives in the area of defense and to provide a positive testimony of what can be done in the European environment at this moment, trying to stimulate an inspiring exchange of ideas. In other words, this event may help us in our efforts to reflect on the further implementation of the Ghent framework.

I wish you very fruitful debates and I thank you for your kind attention.

Prof. Ioan Mircea Paşcu



“Introductory comments on Defence Cooperation and the EU”

Talking Points .../...

1. Dr. Louis Simon is right when he is saying that “... (European) crisis management has become progressively obsolete in the light of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment characterised by an overall retreat of Western power globally; a weakening of America’s commitment to European security; an increasingly tumultuous European neighbourhood; and Europe’s financial troubles.”
2. Moreover, after 20 years of cashing in the “peace dividend” after the end of the Cold War, when “crisis management” has become the core of defence activity, one could say that the current shadow cast over covers the entire field of security and defence. Indeed, it has already become a common fact of life that defence budgets are being cut, in spite of the visible deterioration of the general security environment.
3. Therefore, we are called to first stop and then reverse this dangerous course, if we want to avoid losing the progress achieved in security and defence cooperation and maintain a good starting basis for when the current difficulties will be overcome.
4. Basically, in my view, there are two ways to do it: one, from up downwards, the other, bottom up. Personally, I am sceptical regarding the former, but mildly optimistic regarding the latter, based mainly on the experience of the EURO countries, which are obliged to come up with a “more, not less Europe” solution to their current difficulties. Let me explain myself.

5. Libya – a perfect first test for CSDP – has not been passed. Both political will and C2 (Command and Control) have been lacking. Consequently, France and Britain were forced to appeal to NATO, accepting a “coalition of the willing”, a concept which many Europeans, particularly France, were opposed to in the early 2000s.
6. Further, lack of clarity in setting the political objectives of the operation, the divorce between the air campaign (pursued by NATO) and the ground operation (pursued by the rebels), the lack of sensitive capabilities like targeting specialists, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and air-refuelling as well as rapid exhaustion of ammo stocks are all indicating that, right now, Europe can undertake a similar operation only with great difficulty. In a larger context, it indicates the state of our military capabilities and preparedness, as well as what NATO really means when the US takes a step back. (Here I would like to point to the vicious circle we seem to be in: the more we diminish our security effort, the more we determine the US to weaken their commitment to us, which, in turn, would only compel us to increase our effort in the future ...)
7. To succeed, the “up down” approach needs a minimal level of commonality in interpreting the current international environment. It was impossible to achieve it after the disappearance of the Soviet threat – although a minimal degree has been achieved with respect to a set of threats like international terrorism, cyber security etc – and it will be even more difficult to achieve it today – or, for that matter, in the near future ... Because today, due to the lack of political will and resources, bilateralism rather than multilateralism tend to become the norm in military cooperation, threatening further fragmentation. (Even during the happier days before the crisis, there was a gap between our intended instruments for intervention and the actual ones we ended up employing once the operation was on ... The fact that all the EU operations have been carried out with a rather improvised mixture of national instruments instead of those we carefully prepared in anticipation - no BG has been employed whatsoever, for instance - is self telling in that respect).
8. Beyond that, the public, although aware at the deterioration of the security environment, is not in the mood to contemplate even the maintaining of the current levels for the defence budgets, let alone their increase. Consequently, political leaders, instead of “leading”, prefer to become “followers” of the pols, paying exaggerated attention to any changes in the mood of the public ... It is obvious that, under such conditions, a vigorous security debate, indispensable to achieve the commonality we were talking about and to reverse the current downward trend seems out of the question ...
9. Then, the current strengthening of integration – even if negatively incentivised – among the EURO members, which seems only marginally applicable to the non-EURO members, makes us wonder what would be the impact of such a de facto stratification within the EU on future security and defence cooperation?
10. In contrast, as I already indicated, I am slightly optimistic about the bottom up approach and I am glad to notice that our discussion today is almost entirely devoted to it. Training in the ESDC and EMYLIO could certainly be very helpful. EDA, in turn, could perform a lot of useful tasks and undertake many useful initiatives. The current examples of military cooperation which are going to be discussed today are a testimony to the potential success of this approach. Only that there is a catch: they will succeed only if they are strategically integrated so that they can generate the new momentum we all are expecting. Thank you for your attention and best wishes of success to your reunion.

Brigadier Jon Mullin



European Defence Capabilities Identifying, Coordinating & Facilitating Development

Abstract:

EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and introduces solutions to improve defence capabilities. But it can only succeed when its shareholders – the participating Member States – deliver these capabilities.



European Defence Capabilities Identifying, Coordinating & Facilitating Development

Royal Higher Institute for Defence
Brussels
20 October 2011

European Defence Agency

Building Capabilities for a Secure Europe



Brigadier Jon Mullin
EDA Capabilities Director

European Defence Agency Mission



**“To support the Member States and the Council
in their effort to improve European defence capabilities
in the field of crisis management
and to sustain the CSDP as it stands now and
will evolve in the future.”**

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2004/551/CFSP, 12 July 2004



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Main Functions – Main Functional areas



- Developing defence capabilities
 → • Capability Directorate
- Promoting collaborative defence research
 → • R & T Directorate
- Promoting armaments co-operation
 → • Armaments Directorate
- Improving the defence technological and industrial base and supporting the creation of a competitive European defence equipment market
 → • Industry & Market Directorate



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Identifying Capabilities for Improvement



- Capability Based Planning:

“A capability exists if you have the ability to fulfill a task”

- Spans the “Defence Lines of Development”:

Training

Doctrine

Equipment

Organisational

People

Infrastructure

Information

Logistics



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Capability Development Plan



Headline Goal 2010

EUMC

Future Capability Trends

EUMC / EDA

Picture of joint military capabilities - requirements & needs to meet the **current** CSDP political policy assumptions – in a **changing** world - whilst displaying current & future challenges

EUMC

Lessons Identified

EDA

MS Defence Plans & Programmes



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R&T – 12 Technological Areas



Information, Acquisition & Processing	Guidance, Energy & Materials	Environment, Systems & Modelling
IAP01 Components	GEM01 Materials & Structures	ESM01 Naval Systems & their Environment
IAP02 Radio Frequency Sensor Systems & Signal Processing	GEM02 Energetics, Missiles & Munitions	ESM02 Aerial Systems & their Environment
IAP03 Optical Sensor Systems & Signal Processing	GEM03 Ground Systems & their Environment	ESM03 Systems of Systems, Space, Simulation & Experiment
IAP04 Communication/Information Systems & Networks	GEM04 Guidance & Control	ESM04 Human Factors & CBR Protection



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CDP Framework: Military Tasks across Time



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Capability Development Plan (CDP)



CDP Top 10 Priorities

- Counter-IED
- Medical support
- Intelligence Surveillance Recce
- Cyber Defence
- Increased Availability Helicopters
- Multinational Logistic Support
- CSDP Information Exchange
- Airlift Management
- Fuel and Energy
- Mobility Assurance

Core Drivers / Environment

- Comprehensive Approach
- Network Enabled Capability
- Radio Spectrum Management
- Space
- Single European Sky

Maturing / Mature Actions

- Maritime Mine Counter Measures
- Chemical Bio Radiological Nuclear
- Counter-Manportable Air Defence Sys
- Human Intelligence

Coordinating Capability Improvement



- **Steering Boards:**
 - Ministers
 - Capability Directors
 - National Armaments Directors
 - R&T Directors
- **EDA Collaborative "Way of Working"**
 - Organisational
 - Process
 - Tools

Capability "Spectrum"



KNOWLEDGE

- Command
- Inform

ENGAGEMENT

- Engage
- Protect

MANOEUVRE

- Deploy
- Sustain

Integrated Development Teams

Capability "Spectrum"



R&T – 12 Technological Areas



Information, Acquisition & Processing	Guidance, Energy & Materials	Environment, Systems & Modelling
IAP01 Components	GEM01 Materials & Structures	ESM01 Naval Systems & their Environment
IAP02 Radio Frequency Sensor Systems & Signal Processing	GEM02 Energetics, Missiles & Munitions	ESM02 Aerial Systems & their Environment
IAP03 Optical Sensor Systems & Signal Processing	GEM03 Ground Systems & their Environment	ESM03 Systems of Systems, Space, Simulation & Experiment
IAP04 Communication/Information Systems & Networks	GEM04 Guidance & Control	ESM04 Human Factors & CBR Protection

EDA Investment Tools



- EDA Operational Budget Funding - €8M annually:
 - Operational Studies
 - Concepts & requirements Development
 - Technical Studies
 - Concept Demonstrators
- Category B Projects – pMS “Opt In”
 - R&T
 - Capabilities/Armaments
 - Technology Demonstrators
- Category A Projects – pMS “Opt Out” - JIPs
- European Framework Cooperation

Facilitating Capability Improvement



Practical Examples:

- C-IED
- MARSUR
- Helicopter Availability
- Strategic Transportation
- Third Part Logistic Support



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Counter – Improvised Explosive Devices



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MARSUR (Maritime Surveillance Networking)



- 15 pMS in total
- 6 pMS volunteered for demonstration (ES, **FI**, FR, IT, SE, UK)
- Next step > ad hoc Cat B project



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Helicopter Availability



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Strategic Transportation

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Third Party Logistic Support

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Facilitator - Pooling and Sharing



- European issue, European budgets, European solutions
- Avoid Duplication with NATO
- MS driven, EDA facilitator
- EDA to help delivering tangible projects
 - CDP actions (CIED, maritime surveillance, heli...)
 - Lessons from Libya operations (AAR, ISR, Precision engagement..)
 - pMS projects (IT - medical support, FR – transport pilot education..)
- EDA to help facilitating initiation/delivery of future projects
 - Identify Showstoppers and develop enablers
 - Balanced framework for role specialisation
 - Models/ schemes to go beyond the piecemeal approach

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Capability Improvement



- Collaborative - Emphasis
- Improvement - Across Defence Lines of Development
- Integrated Approach – Cap, Arm, R&T, I&M
- Output Orientated
- Flexibility – Range of Mechanisms – Short/Medium/Longer
- Capability Development Plan:
 - Alignment
 - Prioritisation
 - Delivery

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Dr Luis Simón



CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: out of area or out of business ?

Abstract:

The EU's ineffectiveness vis-à-vis Libya and the Southern Mediterranean crises more broadly are largely explained by CSDP's narrow mandate around (soft) crisis management. The EU's emphasis on external crisis management was strategically sound given the geopolitical context of the 1990s, when Western hegemony made expeditionary intervention a tool for expanding the West's (and Europe's) geopolitical influence. In turn, CSDP's quiet drifting towards a 'softer' kind of crisis management from the mid-2000s was also instrumental in highlighting the EU's differences from post-11 September US unilateralism. This said, (soft) crisis management has become progressively obsolete in the light of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment characterised by an overall retreat of Western power globally; a weakening of America's commitment to European security; an increasingly tumultuous European neighbourhood; and Europe's financial troubles. In order to meet the demands of a changing geopolitical environment, CSDP must break away from its distinctively reactive approach to security (i.e. crisis management/intervention) to include all the functions normally associated with the military including, chiefly, deterrence and prevention. This would allow the EU to actively shape its regional and global milieu.

Captain Pieter-Jan Parrein



Military spillover:

Getting an own dynamic in European military cooperation initiatives

During this lecture we will try to look at what is needed to get an own dynamic in European military cooperation and connect this to some of the current initiatives on a European and sub-European level. It will be shown that such a dynamic can lead to systematically deeper cooperation and as such can automatically bring it on the political-military and political level of military security cooperation.

The theorising during this lecture on this spillover effect will be based for the major part on the example of the evolution of the Belgian-Dutch Navy cooperation that will be linked to one of the most important European integration theories that also makes use of the concept of spillover.

Nevertheless, the main aim of this lecture is not to emphasise a possible theory behind defence cooperation but to support certain ideas or ways that can most efficiently lead to more military cooperation within the EU and even more defence cooperation because of the fact that they establish a process that systematically leads to more cooperation, an own cooperation dynamic. Of course, the political reality surrounding military security that sets limits to this dynamic or could lead to the inverse process will also be dealt with.

Dear members of Eurodéfense, distinguished guests,

I am honored that the organizers of this conference have given me twenty minutes of their time to provide you with some reflections on European defence cooperation. These reflections are my own as a researcher of the Royal Higher Institute for Defence and aren't in any way official viewing points of Belgian Defence. Let us start with a little reminder: "The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides." (Article 42.2 of the current Treaty of the EU after Lisbon) So the end goal of European defence cooperation is clear: a common EU defence. And I fully agree with the motto of our Eurodéfense co-hosts of today: «Il ne peut y avoir de défense sans Europe, ni d'Europe sans défense» (Eurodéfense.net). As also Luis has stated in his lecture, a more capable common EU defence is a necessary complement to give a political role to the EU in the multipolar world that is being established. In my presentation I will give you some thoughts on the added value of sub-European regional defence cooperation in the current state of affairs of defence cooperation in Europe.


Unfortunately we haven't found the right cooperation dynamic yet to make our 27 or 28 national defences and the corresponding national defence policies more European. The Lisbon Treaty gave us the tool of Permanent Structured Cooperation but different readings and thoughts about it couldn't get aligned. Instead of a structured cooperation on an EU level came the current pooling and sharing mantra that in my view hasn't found a clear line yet. To me it seems that it is a bit used to give every form of defence cooperation within the EU a European stamp without bothering to know whether it can really contribute to getting closer to the aim of a common European defence in support of a political Europe. The differences in magnitude of the different national defences within Europe also make an inclusive way of cooperation very difficult. Both Belgium and the Netherlands have encountered the limits of cooperating with traditional big partners. But of course we cannot go past the fact that for the major European powers the added value of cooperating with medium powers for enhancing the benefits of scale mostly doesn't way up to the loss in flexibility of the cooperation due to the large amount of deciders and different national industrial players. Nevertheless this presentation will clearly support a vision for improving defence cooperation between the European countries including the major European military powers.

The problem today is that a lot of medium-sized European defence powers can no longer wait; defence cooperation has become a necessity for them if they don't want to further lose national capabilities because of further defence cuts. The former Norwegian Minister of Defence and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg made the link between the nationally shrinking armed forces and being forced to give up capabilities nationally and as such limiting political options. He saw that this evolution was already taking place in the Nordic countries. The statement goes as follows: "This illustrates a wider trend, in which small countries, followed later by larger ones, will be faced with the choice – enter into military partnership with their neighbours or abandon a modern defence capability, with all the political consequences that may entail." It may be clear that military capabilities are politics. Having certain capabilities strengthens the position of the international policy of a state. If Belgium hadn't had capable fighter jets and the political will to use them in Libya we wouldn't be part of the contact group for Libya. By the way, a nice detail in the framework of the remainder of my lecture is the fact that this seat in the contact group is a Benelux seat. The link between capabilities and a place in international politics is also related to keeping defence

capabilities for the whole violence spectrum. Defence shouldn't be just a tool for crisis response but also a security insurance to cope and be better prepared for possible negative security evolutions in the future. Almost all security analysts state that the future of international security is unclear with the coming multipolar world. On the other hand medium size defence powers are under political pressure to abandon the expensive capabilities for the most demanding part of the violence spectrum and instead invest in cheaper capabilities that are mostly adapted to crisis response. In Belgium our maneuver forces have become median infantry battalions that can only perform limited tasks in high intensity fighting. In the Netherlands the two tank battalions have been set aside during the defence cuts of April this year. So the medium-sized European defence powers of the Benelux and the Nordic countries have the same what I call medianization problem.

At the same time little is to be expected from the big European defence powers for a more inclusive vision on European defence cooperation. France, the long time defender of l'Europe de la defense has taken the bilateral track with the UK and although this can be a nationally pragmatic option from a military angle this still is an important policy shift for the future of the EU. The UK-France cooperation has also been placed in the pooling and sharing mantra but in fact it has little to do with more European defence as the British Secretary of State Liam Fox stated in the House of Commons: "This is not about increasing the defence capabilities of the European Union. I repeat – this is about two sovereign nations, which between them spend 50% of all the defence spending of the NATO members in Europe, and 65% of the research spending." Without more cooperation between medium-sized defence powers European defence is heading towards a two-speed-defence and as Stoltenberg underlines with all the political consequences entailed also in an EU framework.

Although the Visegrad countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) have shown the first signs to include defence to their regional political cooperation most progress on defence cooperation between medium-sized defence powers has been made by the Nordic and the Benelux countries. In this graph the Nordic countries are in yellow, the Benelux countries in white and the Visegrad countries in red. It is clear that these countries are essentially medium size European defence powers.



The Nordic countries have stepped up their defence cooperation by bringing three already existing cooperation forms within a reinforced cooperation structure, NORDEFECO or the Nordic Defence Cooperation. NORDEFECO became operational last year. It is too early to already have important results but the structure has everything in it to reinforce their cooperation. In fact, there isn't a real Benelux defence cooperation yet. In May of this year there were good signs that we could have a

defence wide cooperation between the Benelux countries already this year. The preparatory work on a defence policy level will be picked up and turned in reality by the new Belgian government. This cooperation will make use of the central cooperation structures of the already deep Belgian-Dutch navy cooperation.

The dynamic within the binational navy cooperation that resulted in a binational staff, binational navy schools and task specialization for logistic support have made it an example for other European defence cooperation initiatives. Already this could be an incentive to work with balanced, more limited forms of cooperation. But what is really interesting to further our case for cooperation forms based on relatively equal countries in a regional political framework instead of ad hoc pooling and sharing is the fact that there is also spillover towards the more political side of defence cooperation. Implementing task specialization for logistic support in the Belgian-Dutch navy cooperation was only possible with the adoption of a stringent common configuration policy. This policy creates a political pressure on the national political side of defence to really spend pre-allocated funds on the common capacities of the cooperation. The depth of the cooperation and the balance in it had also an influence on the Dutch decision not to abolish the multipurpose frigates in the framework of the defence cuts announced in April this year. And this is clearly a political decision that normally is taken strictly nationally.

There are mixed opinions on the depth of the binational character of the Admiral Benelux staff, the binational staff that controls the combined Belgian-Dutch fleet. What is clear from the agreements establishing this staff, is that all the people working for this staff are working for the whole of the fleet so both Dutch and Belgian ships. It is most probable that someone of the other nationality plays a role in the operational steering also for national operations. It is even more probable that navy personnel with the Dutch nationality will have a major role in the logistic support for a Belgian frigate and vice versa for the mine hunters. There isn't anymore a total national independence for the still national operations but until now, this hasn't posed a political problem. In the near future a MOU on mixed crews will be signed to make it easier to have people of both nationalities on board of the still national ships. A further step would be to have ships under a common Admiral Benelux flag and operating in a binational or Benelux framework. This is not wild thinking of a military cooperation enthusiast. There are clear signs that the deep binational navy cooperation leads to more working in a binational way, there is even talk about a binational identity. Here are a few examples of this binational working: There were plans to use a Dutch command ship for a Belgian command over ATALANTA. The Belgian logistical command ship is both used by Dutch and Belgian commanders. Belgian helicopters are used as board helicopters for Dutch vessels. Other examples are the fact that Belgian ships cooperate in programs that have formerly been associated to the Netherlands, such as counter drugs in the Caribbean and the African Partnership Station program. Also worth to mention is the inclusion of Belgian assets in the international framework for amphibious cooperation where the Netherlands are a member nation. As a last example we can mention both navies working more binationally through the Admiral Benelux structure for the Belgian-Dutch presence in the Standing NATO MCM group.


For a Belgian-Dutch defence cooperation in a Benelux defence framework there will even be more possibilities to have spillover from the military cooperation to a political cooperation. Pooling capabilities in a balanced way shouldn't be the end state of this Benelux cooperation, also a balanced way of sharing capabilities becomes a possibility. Exercises between the Dutch and Belgian defence


forces could predict a future sharing of maritime and air transport means that have been developed in a complementary way because of historical reasons. A common NEO or non-combattant evacuation policy could make use of these complementary assets.

All these forms and possibilities of spillover to the political side will need a political framework to be managed. Regional political organizations already have such a framework in place, you only have to add defence to the list of competences.

I want to come back on a second word in the remark of mister Stoltenberg. He said that you can best cooperate with your neighbors. If one places this remark in its Nordic context this means cooperation between the relatively equivalent Nordic countries that share a geopolitical and historical background. Next to the fact that geographical closeness is very useful to build a deep defence cooperation in domains such as logistics, education, training and operational steering, living in the same geographical area also makes that there is a bigger chance to have also the same international security issues and visions which can contribute to a common vision for a defence policy.


The possibilities and the existing political framework within regional European organizations make that cooperations on the basis of these regional political groupings are more in line with the political aspect of European defence cooperation than ad hoc pooling and sharing. Ad hoc pooling and sharing between different constellations of member countries can maybe result in more defence cooperation for a specific capability and even for some of the supporting capabilities. But pooling and sharing sets the capability centrally in defence cooperation, the link with the political aspect of defence cooperation is more limited than defence-wide cooperation between countries that can re-enforce the political position of these countries within the EU. Also, the biggest overhead still consists of the national duplication of corporate staff structures such as personnel management, material management and also political-military policy supporting structures. This national overhead can be more adequately countered by building up a very deep form of defence cooperation for which a smaller, more balanced and more political framework is better suited.





The combination of the two graphs above give already an idea of how the current situation of a highly fragmented and unequal European national defence field (the first graph) can with a close Benelux and Nordic defence cooperation evolve to a less fragmented and more equal political military playing field (the second graph).

The last graph hereunder is what I call a vision of a European defence hooligan. It adds to the former graphs defence cooperation between the Visegrad countries. It also brings the Baltic states together



with the nordic states, what is for the moment a hugely exaggerated vision on the first steps for defence issues that are taken in this political framework that is called NB8. Because of a lack of real political regional structure I haven't dared to put a form of Balkan defence cooperation in this graph that could be based on the HELBROC initiative.

To conclude, if Plan A is working out a cooperation dynamic towards a common European defence at the EU level, then defence cooperation on the basis of regional political cooperations between equal medium and small European defence powers can be seen as Plan B. It can create a more equal political-military playing field and make it again more tempting for the bigger defence powers to work on an inclusive form of European defence cooperation maybe again in a Permanent Structured Cooperation that could even bring forth task specialization and one EU security and defence voice. Thank you for your attention and I am looking forward to your questions and remarks during the Q&A session.

Brigadier General Alain Rouceau



European Air Transport Command (EATC): Innovative way of pooling and sharing

The EATC was established in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, on 1 September 2010. The four participating nations (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) have put most of their Air Transport and Air to Air refuelling assets under the centralised operational control of EATC.

In addition they have transferred different levels of authorities in specific domains (such as fleet management, doctrine, training and exercises...) to harmonise processes between the nations and reach deeper interoperability.

The Initial Operational Capability of the EATC was declared on 11 May 2011. The presentation will analyse the first achievements of this new multinational command and the ongoing challenges.

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND

Integrated ♦ Innovative ♦ Efficient



An Example for Pooling & Sharing

EURODEFENSE - RHID

GBA Rouceau
COS/DCOM EATC

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EATC Concept and Approach



- **Gradually transfer and integrate** with a single multinational command **national responsibilities** which direct the force generation and the mission execution of the combined A T capabilities. [EATC concept]
- **Pooling AT capability** with conditioned relinquishment of sovereignty

<p>Operational pillar</p> <p>Assured availability of assigned assets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OPCON of assigned assets - Revoke ToA procedure - Red card holders - National chain of command 	<p>Functional pillar</p> <p>Nationally defined levels of EATC authority</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 different levels of authority for functional domains, areas and sub-areas
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The EATC Architecture




The European Air Transport Command

<p>Pooling & Sharing of Assets</p> <p>Operational Pillar</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning - Tasking - Mission Control - Analysis & Report <p>Transfer of OPCON</p>	<p>Centre of Expertise for AT</p> <p>Functional Pillar</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Common Policies - Studies - Harmonisation - Interoperability <p>Transfer of Responsibility</p>
<p>Host Nation Support</p>	

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Functional Pillar

Transfer of Authority* over functional tasks

↓

- Harmonisation of force employment, training and logistical support
- Development of policies and common standards related to AT employment

↓

- EATC as the central point for air transport interoperability and standardisation
- Long-term benefits (i.e. reduction of logistical footprint)

* Level dependent on national will
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Operational Pillar

Transfer of OPCON

**Pooling & Sharing air transport assets and
unity of purpose / effort:**

↓

**Efficient and effective use
of available and most suitable assets**

↓

- Less outsourcing
- Less empty space
- Additional training opportunities

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National AT Structure and EATC






MoD / Joint Staff				
Air Staff / Air Force Command				
AT Command	MATraC			
	EATC			
Execution Level	WNG	WNG	SQN	WNG
	SQN	SQN	SQN	SQN

**The EATC is integral part of the
Participating Nations' national chains of command.**

20 October 2011



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Assigned Aircraft

as of: 13 SEP 2011


		ToA	RToA	Non ToA	
	A330	1	0	Falcon 900/20	3
	C-130	10	1	ERJ 145/135	4
<hr/>					
	KDC-10	2	0		
	G-4	1	0		
	C-130	2	0		
<hr/>					
	A340	1	1	KC-135	14
	A310	2	1	A330	1
	C-130	8	6	Falcon	6
	C-160	28	20		
	CN-235	11	8		
<hr/>					
	A310	4	1	A340	2
	C-160	43	1	A310 VIP	2
	C-160 ESS	16	8	A319	2
<hr/>					
				CL-601	4
		Total		131	47
		Ready to Task		60	


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- ### Accomplishments 1/2
- Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 11 May 2011
 - Common procurement: Military Planning Tool
 - Common Diplomatic Clearance
 - EATC Logistic Studies Plan 2011
 - Commander's Conference and Long Term Planning Conference
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- ### Challenges
- Internal and external AT processes
 - IT-network
 - EATC as integral part of military structures
 - EATC treaty and enlargement
 - Mindset and language
 - Mutual trust and confidence
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- ### Way ahead
- 2012 FOC (est.)
 - 2013 Treaty
 - Enlargement
 - 2013/2014 permanent infrastructure
 - Social aspects (integration, schooling...)
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Colonel Kris Dewilde



The Importance of the EDA for Medium and Small Defence Countries

Abstract:

EDA could be a well performing organisation for medium and smaller nations if confidence and trust from those nations could be achieved.

EDA is an organisation where decisions are taken by the Steering Board, if necessary by qualified majority voting. For smaller nations it is very difficult even impossible to follow all the work that is done in the different workshops, expert groups and meetings.

Nevertheless, by bringing national experts together a lot of work could be done supporting national decision processes that could be based on information and studies and that could not be achieved on an individual basis. But for this some changes are necessary.

Excellencies, Generals, Admirals, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

Before starting my briefing on the “Importance of the European Defence Agency (EDA) for medium and small defence countries” I would ask you to take note of the fact that what I will say during this intervention is my own personal vision based on my experiences in different fora preparing the Europe of armaments, creating and working with the EDA.

The ideas I will express can not be considered as the position of Belgian defence or government but are a very personal view on the subject.

As you know in Europe there are two kinds of nations: the smaller nations and the smaller nations that think they are big. I will focus on the first group.

As an optimist, I will inform you on the “hopes and expectations” we had in EDA after the difficult period of the West European Armament Group when early 2000 the need for consensus was blocking every progress in Europe. Although with the West European Armament Organisation and the European Armament Agency we were at that time close to a solution. Unfortunately the know-how that was gathered during that period was not used in the best way to further develop the Europe of armaments.

In the next part, as a realist, I will explain you the “reality” of EDA as we can all notice it today. An EDA that has made some important realisations but that currently is pushed forward or stopped by the bigger nations. The medium and small nations that are not always able to follow or understand what is happening in all the different meetings and fora are losing fate in this for them nevertheless important organisation.

Next as a pessimist I will elaborate on the risks this situation could have for European defence cooperation, the European Defence Technology Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the Defence Agency.

And I will end as a dreamer in elaborating on possible actions that could be taken to improve the situation and rebuild confidence of nations in EDA.

First the optimist

Early 2000 with the Helsinki headlines goals and the ECAP process there were a lot of bottom up ideas to foster European co-operations. Unfortunately, due to a lack of top down guidance and planned common budgets, it was at that moment impossible to realize them. This was the reason why in 2003 the Head of States decided to create a European Defence Agency.

When preparing the creation of the EDA in 2004 the aim was to offer to European nations a forum with a political impetus focussing on four main functions

1. To develop Defense capabilities;
2. To promote Defense Research and Technology (R&T);
3. To promote armaments co-operation;
4. To create a competitive European Defense Equipment Market and to strengthen the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base.

Expectations were high because for the medium and small nations this meant

1. that a common European process translating the European Security and Defence Policy into Common Staff Targets (CST), Common Staff Requirements (CSR) and next in common projects would be put in place;
2. that based on a Long Term Vision (LTV) a European Capability Development Plan (CDP) would be put in place giving guidance to member states individual plans, EDA being the EU reference for nations capability planners;

3. that a Level Playing Field would be created where in an open and competitive environment best value for money could be achieved, at the same time fostering a strong and competitive European Defence Technology and Industrial Base;
4. that Research and Technology investments would not only be technology or industrial driven but would be closely linked to capability needs;
5. that a framework of best practices and standards would be put in place, and that it would be trained fostering future co-operation in Europe.

Medium and small nations were looking forward to exchange their know-how, to contribute to a larger common European objective, a common European process, a common European planning and why not in the end a common European defence budget for financing the overarching projects for the benefit of all European nations.

So EDA should be important for medium and smaller nations,

1. because through EDA, member states would have access to knowledge in all expert fields with a possible exchange of experience between them;
2. because members states would be able to reduce their own national staff developing national capability plans;
3. because EU capabilities would be standardized facilitating co-operation during EU led operations;
4. because a level playing field for the defence market would give their Small and Medium Enterprises (SME's) fair changes on the European defence market;
5. because through co-operation small investments in defence R&T could give a bigger return;
6. because best practices would be put in place harmonizing project management procedures applied by different nations and making it easier to co-operate in common projects.

It was our hope that EU, through a LTV and a CDP, could contribute in identifying the EU capability needs, and that we as nations based on this, and together with capability needs identified by NATO, and our own national identified needs would be able to very quickly take decisions on where we should invest our already shrinking defence budgets.

We were looking towards the EDA as a facilitator, fostering cooperation, bringing nations together and help them finding the right way to cooperate and supporting them in their work.

The realist

Today 7 years later I think it is realistic to say that EDA and its member states (because for me it is one entity) has made some progress but did not always satisfy the need:

What EDA and its member states realised:

1. Is a Capability Development Plan based of a LTV, identifying some critical capabilities. Although I don't think that taking a vote was the best way to identify the most critical ones.

2. A link between research and technology investment and capabilities was put in place through the CapTechs. With the Joint Investment Program vehicle a solution was found for common R&T investment.
3. An R&T strategy indicating the Ends, the Means and the ways to go was finalised.
4. Through an armament strategy a link was prepared to OCCAR and an important education and training objective based on European best practices was approved.
5. A Code of Conduct (CoC) on defence procurement aiming at opening the closed European defence market under Art 346, in order to create a level playing field in Europe, was put in place. In the same context a voluntary reduction and harmonisation of offset was accepted.
6. A strategy to implement a European Defence Technology Industrial Base was approved.
7. A lot of effort was put into short term quick wins: Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Air to Air Refuelling, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Future European Soldier Systems, unfortunately not always with success.

What EDA did not realise:

1. There is still no unique common process in place translating the European Security and Defence Policy through Common Staff Targets and Common Staff Requirements into projects.
2. The definition of the urgent Capabilities to be developed based on the LTV seems more difficult than expected.
3. Where the first Joint Investment Program (JIP) projects Force Protection could bring together large budgets, for the current JIPs Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies and CBRN it is more difficult to get the necessary financial support.
4. The CoC on defence procurement is in place. Especially medium and small member states have reduced their offset requirements but we still do not have a level playing field in place. Through the CoC the bigger nations have a better access to the markets in all EDA nations but the industries of those smaller nations mostly SME's are not able to compete on the bigger European market being in the hands of some prime contractors. Electronic Bulletin Board 1 (EBB 1), where all nations are publishing their contracts under Art 346 can be called a success and it created more transparency, EBB 2 where primes should publish contract opportunities for subcontractors and SME's is not successful at all.
5. No best practices for armaments cooperation are identified yet and no training opportunities are put in place. So today common projects are still based on national procedures of one lead nation and not on a common European project management accepted as best practice.
6. A lot of capability but also industrial driven projects are offered by the bigger EDA nations for cooperation to their colleagues.
7. Common developed projects defining Common Staff Requirements that seem to become successful are, forgive me the word, "hijacked" by the bigger nations.
8. A lot of different projects emerged from EDA but are not always supported by an urgent capability need (more than 18 Project Teams + other projects).

9. EDA meetings are mostly animated by the bigger nations and pushed forward in a direction that suits them or their industry the most. This should not be considered as a statement against the bigger nations because they are doing the work and without opposition from others they can go on.
10. EDA has a very extensive work plan supported, I have to admit, by a very poor operational budget. In this work plan no clear priorities were defined.
11. A lot of meetings not always well organised, and some times on topics already being treated at NATO and other International Organisations took place. For medium and small nations it is today impossible to attend all those meetings with experts so they have to make their choices.
12. Unfortunately no reports are made for most of the EDA meetings. Nevertheless EDA staff always draws their own operational conclusions that are presented to EDA PoC and PrepCom meeting as the meetings conclusions.
13. Because the confidence in EDA is slowly but certainly diminishing we see that only for some meetings experts are coming from abroad. In most of the cases Brussels Reps are representing medium and small nations just taking note for reporting to their national experts.
14. When finally decisions are proposed at PoC or PrepCom level the medium and small nations try to understand the problem and, by lack of the complete information, are blocking decisions.

We see that important project as Defence Test and Evaluation Base (DTEB) and the integration of UAS in civilian airspace have a reduced participation and are slowly losing support from the medium and small member states and even from the bigger ones.

As facilitator EDA was not always helping and fostering co-operation. I remember high level EDA staff saying: “we are only a facilitator, we are not supposed to do anything; it is up to the member states to do the work. It is only by our presence, being a catalyst that things should advance”.

Without making it a general remark I think that the meetings in EDA where an agenda and the work documents are distributed well in advance of the meeting and where at the end of the meeting operational conclusions are put on paper and distributed afterwards to all EDA nations (also those not present at the meeting) are rather scarce. Although we see some improvement.

But also medium and small nations made some mistakes:

1. There is no co-ordination between the medium and small nations. Where the bigger nations see each other on a regular basis be it in bilateral cooperation, ETAP, Lol or OCCAR meetings this is not the case for the medium and small nations. So they are not able to align their positions and make a front.
2. Also their national structure was and is still not adapted to deal with this new situation of an Agency working on a capability oriented basis with Capability Functional Areas and Integrated Development Teams where at the same moment NATO is still fostering the Main Armament Group approach (Land, Maritime, Air).

The pessimist.

As a pessimist I will now have a look at what could be the risks.

The risk exists that:

1. nations will fall back on national or bilateral capability development;
2. medium and small nations will develop their own CST or CSR not necessary harmonised or in line with existing standards;
3. medium and small nations will open market for best price value solutions (not necessary a European one).

As especially smaller nations have accepted to reduce their offset and open their markets we see today that SoS and Sol are misused to limit the scope of the defence market to national level. This could jeopardize the creation of an equal level playing field.

The initiative of the bigger nations to take over some new projects and to push them forward is a commendable initiative but also a dangerous one for European co-operation and the EDTIB.

If those nations are not taking into account the needs of the medium and small nations there is a risk that the latter will define, in the best case together with fellow member states, but most probably independently their CSR. Following national and European legislation they will launch their procurement process and the result would not necessary be the equipment developed by the bigger European nations but could even be non European equipment jeopardizing European standardization and the development of a strong EDTIB.

A lot of medium and small nations are falling back on older forms of co-operation. We see that regional co-operation gains again importance: NORDIC co-operation, BENELUX co-operation.

Fostering quick-wins on the short terms makes us to forget our long term needs. Today preference is given by EDA to the support to possible projects (Cat B or Cat A). The overall programme supporting framework, with common Best Practices, common Procedures, common training and education is put aside. Unfortunately it is exactly this overall framework that facilitates co-operation between European nations.

Although the integration of unmanned aerial systems in civil airspace was one of the first EDA projects, after seven years we still don't have a roadmap clearly indicating where we are going to, how we will do it, what the necessary budgets are and when those budgets are needed.

Of course not only EDA is to blame for this but also the member states. These were not always giving full support to all EDA initiatives.

The same applies to the selection of temporary staff at all levels for the EDA top management and EDA directorates. During full seven years of its existence it has been a very strange and non-transparent process that caused multiple conflicts and is certainly not giving EDA Staff the necessary confidence the should have. Due to this, the impression sometimes rose amongst the small and medium member states that preference was given to candidates from the bigger nations.

Today there is a big risk that medium and small nations are losing confidence in the EDA because they consider the organisation as a tool in the hands of the bigger nations to foster their own national defence industrial base.

There is a risk that medium and small nations will not fully contribute to the work of EDA but will look from aside at the evolutions that are going on.

At the same time they will reduce their financial contributions to the EDA projects because they do not understand or are not able to follow. Other important European projects as UAS and Single European Sky (SES) / SES Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) could be the victim of this.

As a dreamer I will now formulate some possible actions:

EDA should urgently focus on some important priorities, not only on the short term but certainly also on the middle and longer term. This would give EDA the time to come forward with results. The EDA work plan of today is very extensive, the operational budget very small. EDA should pick out every year a maximum of ten priority projects and come by the end of the year with tangible progress to its stakeholder, justifying that the budgets are being well used. This will bring back confidence.

EDA should not only focus on projects with quick-wins but also start developing the framework of processes and best practices in order to offer to future projects a common framework known and accepted by all member states. Tools for education and training of those processes and best practices should also be put in place.

EDA should respect its own staff regulations and selections procedures in recruiting staff, outsourcing the process to an independent external organisation if not possible, in order to get the best man on the right place. Today we see a big discrepancy between an organisation as OCCAR and the EDA in selecting their staff with the necessary consequences.

EDA meetings should be better prepared:

1. with an agenda and working documents distributed well in advance so that national staffing with experts could be done before the meeting;
2. new directions or new documents presented during the meeting should be highly exceptional;
3. with bilateral discussions between EDA staff and stakeholders before the meeting;
4. with optimal use and preparation through the extranet forum;
5. with operational conclusions at the end of the meeting approved by all participating stakeholders (or if not with their remarks);
6. with clearly defined action items (with a clear deadline);
7. with a report of the meeting so that nations that were not able to participate can, if they want, catch up easily.

This will permit all nations to follow what is happening and if necessary contribute even without being present at all meetings. In the end EDA will get the necessary support and budgets allocated for the different projects.

Budgetary planning should be more transparent and better organized. Budgets have to be planned well in advance. Also budgets for Cat B, Cat A and JIP have to be planned. In order to nationally foresee a budget a business case has to be presented. This business case should clearly indicate what the objectives of the project are, what the timeline is and the required budget. Studies to study what should be studied are not acceptable anymore (Air4All). Clear criteria for accepting the result of such a study and paying the performer should be mentioned in the business case.

Last but not least nations should also create national processes in dealing with EDA. Information on this could be exchanged between them. The medium and small nations should create a forum within the EDA if possible, outside if not accepted, where they could inform each other and align their positions and by this facilitating final decisions during EDA Steering Boards.

This ends my contribution. I would like to thank for your attention. Please do not consider this brief as an attack on EDA or the bigger nations but as contribution to foster co-operation in Europe and bringing nations closer together in mutual respect.

Thank you.

Wing Commander Andrew Gray



Voluntaristic operational

A Future European Helicopter Wing: taking European helicopter cooperation to the next level

Abstract:

Since 2008, EDA has been assisting the participating Member States (pMS) in enhancing their helicopter capability through training. This has included the procurement of the Interim Synthetic Tactics Course and the delivery of 4 multinational helicopter exercises.

We are working towards better understanding and interoperability. Does this present an opportunity to go to the next step and form multinational units? Could this deliver new capabilities through sharing costs and allowing more nations to participate? How might this work and what are the next steps?



Multinational Helicopter Wing – the next step?

Brussels, 20 Oct 2011
Andy Gray, Helicopter Projects Manager



The Context

- Helicopters are a key capability
 - Freedom of movement
 - Maintain the initiative
 - Force Protection
- JAPCC Conference “our asymmetric advantage”.
- Future conflicts will require mobility

The Problem

- Not enough transport helicopters
 - Afghanistan, Iraq, Chad
 - NRF and EUBG generation
- “ I wasn’t short of CAS or soldiers, every day
I was short of Helicopters and ISTAR”
Regional Commander, ISAF
- Expensive capability to buy and maintain
 - Minimum fleet size – not easily scalable
 - Beyond the individual means of many

The Question(s)

If we cannot afford the capability individually, can we afford it if we delivery it together?

Operationally, can we afford not too!

First Steps

- EDA “Increase Helicopter Availability for Operations”
 - Live exercises – 74 helicopters, 150+ crews, ~2000 pers. (PT and BE)
 - Tactics Symposium (29 & 30 Nov, LU)
 - Tactics simulator: 20 course, 4 crews each, 3-weeks long. 10 pMS (9 Jan 12)
 - Operational English Language Course: 4 weeks, 15 pMS
 - Tactics Instructor Course (2013)
 - NH90 (training, OT&E, Log support)
- Enhancing – YES, but is it enough?
- NO!

Next Step?


Form a multinational unit with individual contributions from interested nations where effect achieved is greater than the sum of the parts.

The Concept

- C17 Strategic Air Capability (SAC)
 - 15 nations signed Lol in 2006
 - MOU in 2008;
 - first aircraft was delivered in 2009.
- Aircraft flown and maintained by multinational crews from the participating nations.
- under the command of a multinational military structure, the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW).

The Concept

Need to be able to sustain deployment
 Ratio required is 4:1
 If we want to deploy 4 – we need 20
 Standard ratio of crews to aircraft is 1.5:1
 So we are looking for 30 crews
 Depending on maintenance solutions
 75 to 100 maintainers
 25 other support staff
 HQ element



The Solutions?

- Buy 20 new helicopters
 - **Too expensive?**
- Use 20 that already exist, but do not contribute to operational capability
 - **Good solution, but which aircraft?**
- Aggregate current fleets to make them more viable
 - **Possible, but fleet management problems**

The Solutions?

- Use 20 that already exist
- Current re-organisations provide opportunity

Netherlands – Cougar
Germany – NH90
Italy – CH47C
US Army CH47D

The Problems?

- Many small ones!
 - Need to find a home
 - Agree the aircraft
 - Achieve the manning
 - Deliver training
 -
 - Find the funding!

The Problems?

- But only 1 big one!
 - **How do we use it?**
- Who decides if and where it deploys?
- What national caveats can be applied?
- Can it deploy without one of the partners?
- **Is there enough trust between the nations to overcome the loss of sovereignty?**

Political Will

- Pooling and Sharing can only work with compromise
- Political decision not an operational one
- Creation is easy (relatively)
- But why create something that cannot be used?
- Currently, the loss of sovereignty prevents pooling and sharing
- **We would really rather be without a capability than rely on others to help us deliver it?**

EDA Activity - MHW

- Concept Paper published 19 Jul 2010
- AHPG MHW held 8 Feb 2011
 - (AT, CZ, DE, ES, FR, HU, NL, RO, SE, UK)
 - “Interesting” “Ambitious”
 - Focus on Transport Helicopters
- Pooling and Sharing
 - Main theme of every meeting for nearly 2 years!

Mr. Hans-Bernhard Weisserth



The European Security and Defence College: Supporting the convergence of civilian and military aspects in EU crisis management through training and education

Since its establishment in 2005, the ESDC has consolidated its position as a balanced network comprising security policy, diplomatic and other civilian institutes, higher defence institutes and universities, as well as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS). Up to now, some 50 institutes and other training actors from almost all Member States have been actively engaged in conducting CSDP training activities. In addition, the ESDC is further deepening its cooperation with external training actors such as the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the NATO Defence College, drawing also on their specific expertise. The current network configuration, its ability to convene in project-orientated formats, e.g. the recently-established format in support of the EU pool of SSR experts, as well as the number and the types of courses, allow the ESDC to fulfil its main mission and objectives, which are to develop and promote a common understanding of CSDP among civilian and military personnel and to enhance the European security culture. Thus, the ESDC makes a significant contribution to the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management.

International Meeting EURODEFENSE

Brussels 20 October 2011

Briefing by: Hans-Bernhard Weisserth,
European Security and Defence College, Acting Head



The European Security and Defence College

Supporting the convergence of civilian and military aspects in EU crisis management through training and education

The ESDC- Supporting the convergence of civilian and military aspects in EU crisis management through training and education

- Structure of the Briefing-

1. Objectives and basic structures
2. Supporting the civ-mil approach – the main features of the ESDC
 - Network of civilian and military training actors
 - ESDC Training concept and activities
 - Training audiences
3. Summary and Conclusions

ESDC – Objectives and main features

ESDC established as a network of civilian and military institutes dealing with CSDP and the EU ISS to:

- Enhance the European security culture within the CSDP
- Promote a better understanding of CSDP among civilian and military personnel
- Provide EU institutions and Member States with knowledgeable people familiar with EU policies, institutions and procedures and able to work efficiently on all CSDP matters
- Help to promote professional relations and contacts among training participants

ESDC – Objectives and main features

ESDC established as a network of civilian and military institutes dealing with CSDP and the EU ISS



- Promote the European security culture within the CSDP
- Promote all CSDP matters civilian and military
- Provide EU institutions with training of civilian and military personnel together
- Help EU Institutions and Member States on all CSDP
- Help promote professional relations and contacts among training participants

ESDC Network Members



ESDC Network Members (examples)

Security Policy and other civilian institutes	Higher Defence Institutes and Universities	Other training actors	External training partners
EU ISS IHEDN Paris BAKS Berlin Diplomatic Academy Sofia Diplomatic Academy Athens Folke Bernadotte Academy Sweden ASPR Stadt Schläining CMC Helsinki ZIF Berlin	CASD Rome CESEDEN Madrid BE Royal Higher Defence Academy RO Defence University AT Defence Academy Polish Defence University National Defence College Stockholm National Defence College Helsinki Higher Defence Institute Lisbon	CEPOL Numerous Ministries in the Capitals including .Foreign Affairs .Defence .Interior National Delegations	Geneva Centre for Security Policy NATO Defence College Rome DCAF/ISSAT Geneva IIHL San Remo



- ### Current ESDC Training Activities
- Basic training activities**
 - CSDP High Level Course (annual course with 4 modules)
 - CSDP Orientation Course (4-5 courses per year / ~ one week)
 - Alumni Seminars (participants of the higher level courses/ 1-2 days)
 - Specialised training activities**
 - CSDP Course for PPI staff
 - CSDP and Africa
 - CSDP High Level Seminar
 - Common CSDP Module (one week/ "European Initiative inspired by Erasmus")
 - CSDP Train-the-trainer Seminar
 - EU Basic Course on Security Sector Reform
 - EU Core Course on Security Sector Reform
 - CSDP Mission Planning Procedures Course
 - Course on EU Capability Development
 - CMCO – Civil Military Co-ordination in CSDP Missions and Operations (10 days)
 - International Law for EU Military Legal Advisor (annual course with 3 modules)
 - Peace Building Course
 - Course on Non-Proliferation for senior officials
 - Civilian Crisis Management Course
 - Advanced Course for Senior Political Advisors working in the wider context of CSDP
 - Training of Trainers for EU SSR in Support of Training for the EU SSR Pool of Experts
 - Forthcoming Pilot Projects**
 - CSDP Senior Mission Leadership Course
 - Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations
 - Other ESDC activities**
 - Annual Networking Conference on Training in the field of CSDP

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Courses providing an overview on the CSDP in a wider CFSP context

Growing closer co-operation between military and diplomatic academies, other civilian institutes and training actors in the conduct of ESDC courses


Regional focus

- Press, Public Information
- Security Sector Reform
- Mission Planning
- Capability Development
- Civ-Mil Co-ordination
- LEGAD
- POLAD
- Civilian Crisis Management
- Peace Building
- Non-proliferation
- Leadership training
- Gender and Human Rights

- Other ESDC activities
- Annual Networking Conference on Training in the field of CSDP

types of training support the comprehensive approach


Co-operation between Executive Academic Board and the EU Structures



Production of Training Material

IN PDF FORMAT
AVAILABLE ON THE
ESDC WEB PAGE
www.esdc.mil-edu.be


2nd Edition available by the end of 2011



Selection of Course Participants

CSDP High Level Course as an example

HLC 2010/2011 Participant's background



ESDC – Training Record

Approximately 3500 diplomats, police, other civilian and military participants, coming from the 27 Member States, candidate states, EU institutions and agencies.

Approximately 400 participants from third states and international organisations.

Current training capacity is about 1200 civilian and military in more than 30 training courses every year.

2009/03/03

Summary

Through its main features

- network of civilian and military training actors
- ESDC Training concept and activities
- civ mil participation in all training activities

the ESDC is able to make a significant contribution to EU's comprehensive approach

Captain (Navy) Cesare Ciocca



The youth owns the future


EMILYO (Exchange of Military Young Officers):

Creating a European defence culture within the military from the basis

Abstract:

EMILYO, the European initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus that is better known as "Military Erasmus" is one of the programmes of the European Security and Defence College. It was launched in November 2008 and important administrative steps have already been taken to make it more easy for young officers to study abroad so that they are brought together in an international environment. In this lecture we will explain the concept and aim of this initiative, as well as the mandate that was given by the Defence ministers to implement it. We will review the current state of affairs including the main progresses made, open issues and developments.

During this lecture we will also demonstrate why it is more effective to create a European Defence culture out of the basic education and the possible implications that this can bring with it.



WHY TO ADDRESS TO THE BASIC EDUCATION

- ❑ Learning results more effective in the long term and more convenient
- ❑ Wider range of options for exchanges compared to those at senior level, including the possibility to choose among different duration (1 month, etc.)
- ❑ Young people are more open to interaction with European colleagues

SITUATION IN AUTUMN '08 – initial stocktaking made by the ESDC Secretariat

- Students exchanges: 956 (1 year)
- Instructors/teachers exchanges: 125 (1 year)
- Differences in national systems (recruitments and courses' curricula)
- 48% MSs do not recognize training done abroad as a rule - 45% MSs consider training abroad in addition to the national training
- 21 MSs adopted the Bologna process – but only 15 Institutions (on a total of 38) had signed an Erasmus charter
- Implementation should be a step by step process – long term perspective as for the Universities

FROM THE “STATEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN YOUNG OFFICERS EXCHANGE SCHEME, MODELLED ON ERASMUS”

Council Conclusions on the ESDP - 2903rd EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting
Brussels, 10 and 11 November 2008

.....

2. The scheme is intended to strengthen the interoperability of the armed forces and promote a European security and defence culture.
3. The ability of the European armed forces to work together has become a determining factor in preparing and conducting increasingly complex multinational military operations. It entails increased cooperation between Member States in the field of officer training.
4. The scheme will provide European officers with an opportunity to undergo part of their training, from the initial training stage, in another Member State. It will thus promote the mobility of students and teaching staff of military training colleges and facilitate shared approaches to the training of young European officers, in particular in the field of the ESDP.
5. The Member States have therefore agreed on a number of practical measures, set out in the Annex hereto, for encouraging and facilitating exchanges between their national training colleges, with assistance from the European Security and Defence College. These measures will be implemented at both European and national level. They will be based on existing bilateral and multilateral exchanges.

**FROM THE
"STATEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN YOUNG OFFICERS
EXCHANGE SCHEME, MODELLED ON ERASMUS"**

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why

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what
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how
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CONCEPTION & PLANNING OF EXCHANGES


Categories of military training

- Academic education
 - Basic military training
 - Professional training
- } **Vocational training**

Duration of exchanges

- 1 week
- 1 month
- 1 semester
- 1 academic year
- The entire basic ed. & tr.

THE ACTORS



CONCRETE ACTIONS SINCE NOV. '08

CSDP COMMON MODULES

- common weeks in National Institutes hosting EU cadets (Portugal, Spain, Austria, Greece);
- prepared through a **Train-the-trainers Seminar** (Brussels, 2.5 days) and the **access to ESDC IDL-system**, both provided by the ESDC Secretariat.

“EMILYO” WEB SITE (<http://www.emilyo.eu>)

- forum for cadets and IG members (**activated and working**)
- data base / info platform for facilitating exchange programmes (**in project**)

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND USERS' GUIDE

"Decision" among the MSs establishing common criteria and modalities for:

- practical implementation of the exchange programmes;
- reciprocal recognition of all training activities.

OTHER COMMON MODULES

Standard curricula on subjects of common interest, including study material. Modules available on **PSO/CMO, Communication, Law of Armed Conflict.**

CONCRETE ACTIONS SINCE NOV. '08 - 2

HIGH LEVEL SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES BY THE EU PRESIDENCIES

•PARIS (NOV. '08)

•BRNO (APRIL '09)

[STOCKTAKING REPORT 2009](#)
(by Sylvain Paile)

•STOCKHOLM (DEC. '09)

•WARSAW (OCT. '11)

[COMPENDIUM \(2011\)](#)
(by Sylvain Paile)

MAIN LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

Comparison of courses based on competencies

in progress (SW)

→ [Creation of a database](#)

Communication strategy – encouragement for national implementation of the exchanges – newsletter – Wikipedia page

permanent (EAB Ch.+ ESDC Secret.+ S.Paile)

Military Life Long Learning Programme – synergies with existing EU programmes in higher education

in progress (CZ Rep.)

Common modules

permanent (FR)

CONCLUSIONS ON MILITARY ERASMUS

- **RELEVANT ADDED VALUE OF EXCHANGES:**
 - For Cadets and Young Officers: wider vision of international context and ability to work in a European context, improvements of language ability
 - For Academies: opportunity to cooperate and exchange best practices
- **LONG TERM VISION AND STEP BY STEP APPROACH**
 - “be patient”
 - “invest” national resources (in the Academies and in the IG).
- **SYNERGIES BETWEEN EXISTING GROUPS OF SINGLE SERVICE ACADEMIES AND THE IG:**
 - exchange information, identify opportunities and possible obstacles,
 - define specific projects and initiatives in line with the expectations, coordinate efforts

**« GAIETY AND LOVE ARE
THE WINGS OF THE
GREAT ENTERPRISES ! »
(GOETHE)**

13

FOR CONTACTS:

Cpt (N) Cesare Ciocca: tel. +39 06 4691 3104,
mob. +39 335 1979879

off. e-mail: formazione.interforze@casd.difesa.it
priv.: cesareciocca@libero.it

ESDC Secretariat:

e-mail: esdc.secretariat@consilium.europa.eu



PARCOUR

- **Conception and adoption**

July – Oct. '08 : initial stocktaking (expert from Liège Univ.), preparation of the political decisions

Nov. '08 : political declaration of the 27 Ministers of Defence

- **Implementation**

Nov. – Dec. '08: Seminars in Paris and St-Cyr

Febr. '09: first IG meeting

Apr. '09: Seminar in Brno (CZ Rep.)

Nov. '09 : Seminar in Stockholm

Feb. '10: Framework agreement and MECTS guide

Apr-May. '10: Detailed stocktaking - 2nd Progress report

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE SECRETARY GENERAL / HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

Brussels, 05 FEB. 2009

SGS9/01633

Dear Ambassador,


In recent years, co-operation between the armed forces of Member States has increased significantly, not least through our ESDP operations and missions. For this cooperation to be deepened further, there is a need for increased interoperability between the armed forces, not only of weapon systems but also of our human resources. To this end, in November 2008 EU Defence Ministers approved a series of practical recommendations aimed at enhancing the exchange of young officers during their basic military training.

We are now seeking to implement these recommendations in order to deliver timely and concrete results. Under the aegis of the European Security and Defence College, an Implementation Group will start to work on this. It will be important for Member States to ensure the right level of representation with the relevant expertise on basic military training for young officers and to be able to contribute to an open and frank exchange of views on implementing the agreed measures. The Implementation Group will have its first meeting in Brussels on the 19 February 2009.

Although implementation of the recommendations will be on a voluntary basis, respecting the decision-making autonomy and the specificities of each Member State, it is important that as many Member States as possible participate in the Implementation Group so as to enhance the quality of the work, even if they do not intend to participate in implementing the initiative as such.

You will find details, on participation in the first Implementation Group meeting on 19 February 2009 in the attached Administrative Instructions together with a tentative programme.

Yours sincerely,



Javier SOLANA

CURRENT TASKS AND ROLES

- **IG: FOLLOWING THE MINISTERIAL AND THE HR MANDATES, IDENTIFY AND IMPLEMENT CONCRETE MEASURES**
 - **DOWN-TOP-DOWN APPROACH** (contact with Academies - refers to the SC of the ESDC →HR)
 - **SYNERGIES AND COMMON EFFORTS**
- **SINGLE SERVICE FORA: DISCUSS AND ADOPT A WIDE RANGE OF INITIATIVES**
 - **BOTTOM-UP APPROACH**
 - **SINGLE SERVICE ENVIRONMENT**
 - **SOURCE AND USERS OF THE IG WORK**

STOCKTAKING REPORT 2009

(<http://esdc.mil-edu.be/index.php/networking-news>
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/infopublic>)

- The Initiative is essentially a step-by-step process.
- To develop a European security culture is a long-term objective – some progress has been already reached.
- More is needed in terms of structure/coordination.

CSDP COMMON MODULES

- More than 400 young officers from 20 Member States have participated
- Great success for the interest in the subject , short duration and the possibility to involve a relevant number of young officers in the same activity
- Some Member States have integrated the CSDP module in their national curricula

CONSIDERATIONS ON OPTIONS

- **ONE COMMON WEEK**
 - Higher number of young officers involved
 - Many opportunities in each academic year
 - Wider contacts between young officers and academies
 - Basis for common short modules
 - Limited objectives/more superficial
- **ONE SEMESTER (University type) OR TWO (1 acad. year)**
 - Limited number of young officers involved
 - More effective education – can include academic & vocational tr.
 - Opportunity for harmonisation of curricula and evaluation system as well as exchange of instructors
- **THE ENTIRE BASIC EDUCATION**
 - The most effective option – includes academic & vocational tr.
 - Requires closer coordination between the partner Academies – should include exchange of instructors
 - Educational objectives and Evaluation system of the partner Academies must be harmonised and formally agreed

CONSIDERATIONS ON OPTIONS - 2


- **ACADEMIC EDUCATION**

- In line with the “Erasmus concept”
- The “semester option” is recommended
- Implies similarities in academic studies
- Needs adoption of ECTS
- Could include in the same period some vocational training

- **VOCATIONAL TRAINING**

- More visible impact on interoperability
- More concretely useful - could be shorter than a semester - could be planned in summer time
- Implies common criteria for students evaluation and reciprocal recognition of training activities
- Could imply reciprocal recognition of special/legal certificates (i.e. licence for manoeuvres)

PROGRAMME AND OBJECTIVES



Dr Jochen Rehrl





National Coordination and Cooperation among Civilian and Military Training Actors: An Austrian example within an EU framework

In Austria, the government is currently working on the establishment of a “security cluster” in the field of “training and education”. Therefore the relevant ministries like the Chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence have established a “training network conference”. In the conference, the ministries together with their training actors such as the Diplomatic Academy (MFA), the National Defence Academy (MOD), the Security Academy (MOI) and the College for Public Administration (Chancellery) are trying to find synergies and common goals. The process involves some NGOs which provide useful and necessary support in this regard. Until now, the conference has been limited to training and education in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (including CSDP related issues).

Some concrete examples as outcomes from the conferences are: regular staff to staff meetings, exchange of lecturers, organisation and conduct of training activities, establishment of the “ESDC Advanced PolAd Course”.

The lecture will give an overview of the Austrian training network taking the training environment on the European level (ESDC, ENTRI, CEPOL, EDA, EDP, FRONTEX...) into account.

Die Trainingslandschaft in Österreich



Admiral (Ret) Willy Herteleer



Nationalism in Europe, in the European Union. Acceptable? Desirable? Avoidable?

Some believe that Louis XIV, king of France once said “L’état c’est moi”, “I am the State”; Wikipedia pretends that he did not, but that he could have.

Anyway he did not say “La Nation c’est moi”, not “I am the Nation”.

It is not certain that the notion “Nation” was well understood at the end of the XVII, beginning of the XVIII century. It is today, isn’t it, well understood.

Today many pretend to participate in the creation of “L’Europe des Nations”, or are they saying they do not want to participate in the creation of the “Nation Europe”; a “Nation” is not created, it evolves over a long, long period. It does not matter very much what they say, providing they are not pretending helping to create “l’Europe des États” and realize that some kind of “État Europe” is being created and is needed

During his last visit to the European Parliament in 1995 President Mitterrand said: “Nationalism is war” and Wim Kok, Dutch Prime Minister in the recent past, said only weeks ago: “Nationalism can undo everything that was achieved in Europe since the Second World War”.

Is this so feared “Nationalism” monolithic? All encompassing? All including?

No, it is not:

Let us consider some domains for which Nationalism in Europe might be acceptable or even desirable and some others where this is not the case:

- for Cheese and Wine: of course.
- for Culture and Folklore: most certainly.
- for Internal Affairs and Social Security: less certain
- for Energy and Mobility: Probably not.
- for Economy and Finance: a drama for the Europeans.
- for Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense: a disaster for the World.

The list is the result of answers to the question “Are National solutions the best for problems in the domain concerned”.

Recent crises in the bank-, financial- and economic domains help us formulate those answers and so do considerations on environmental issues and climate change.

Linked to this ideas of nationalism is the perception of sovereignty: let it just be noted that the greatest expression of sovereignty is the possibility to delegate it.

But it is in Security and Defense that most actions were taken internationally. Kuwait, former Yugoslavia, a number of theatres in Africa, Afghanistan, and now the Arab Spring Nations have all required and are requiring an international rather than a national management approach often using security and defense tools.

For all those international actions in the different domains it is important for the UN, the EU and NATO to function correctly, efficiently and timely.

Crisis's in the economic and financial domains lead almost inevitably to smaller defense budgets. It will not be different in the near future: if a country has to diminish its overall budget by three percent to reach a deficit of not more than the accepted three percent we can expect a cut in the defense budget of five to ten percent.

Some pretend it is possible to do more with less, or to do better with less, that is doubtful. The challenge for the future is going to be: to do the best possible with less. And, certainly, that “best possible with less” can only be found in international solutions.

There are many, many examples of multinational, partial solutions, of international cooperation's. But mostly they seem to be the result of a bottom-up approach rather than the consequence of a deliberate policy formulated by the political level. In the European Union there are, for the moment, no clear messages on this, not from the Council, nor from the Commission and nor from Parliament. It must be said that lately some Capitals have been asking for initiatives in this field, unfortunately countered by some other Capitals.

Below the highest political level themes such as logistics, training, maintenance, medical support, force protection including measures to counter improvised explosive devices, and protection against

NRBC threats are identified as areas where many projects of international cooperation are feasible. All justified, yes, but in the EU, not ambitious enough.

The realization of a Military Capability can be seen in three phases: 1.the development and the acquisition of the equipment, 2. the preparation in French “la mise en condition” and 3. the employment in French “la mise en oeuvre”.

In the “POOLING and SHARING” reflection in the European Union each of these three phases should be addressed.

For the last phase, la mise en oeuvre, the EU should give itself the tools allowing for that employment, also independently from NATO; scenarios can be imagined where it would be on request of NATO . For the moment the operational planning and command facility for this is partly lacking. By the way, it is for this phase that the WEU and later NATO were created.

As far as the second Phase, la mise en condition, is concerned it is evident that if you want to act together you have to train together. Training together allows for a better approach of the possible realities of “Comprehensive” “Combined” “Joint” employment, it also results in a better use of scarce space and resources. During the cold war, NATO exercises, live and CPX, served this purpose.

But it is in the first phase, the development and acquisition of equipment, that lies the greatest challenge for the European Union in this field, and this not only for the replacement of existing equipment but also for the acquisition of equipment for newly identified required capabilities.

The development of new prototypes Aircraft, Main Battle Tanks, War Ships has become too expensive to be done in the EU by a single nation.

Some capabilities such as observation/communication from space, ballistic missile defense, projection of airpower from the sea, and many others are difficult if not impossible to be achieved by a single European Nation.

It is in this area that nationalistic considerations of economic/employment nature and of acceptable interdependency, or not, will complicate the decision-making. The existence of EDA is the recognition of this priority challenge.

To go back to the start of this day: is in my perception the glass half empty or half full?

My first real experience in this field was a Ministerial WEU meeting in Paris in August 1990 in reaction to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. The glass proved to be empty (it was also empty in NATO).

Looking at the EU Operations, using also the Military Capabilities, of today and of the recent past, gigantic steps have since been taken ... slowly.

So in my perception the glass is definitely half full and filling ... slowly.