



**EWG 1 “European Security and Defence Doctrine”**  
**Final Report on the European Security Strategy**  
**(November 6<sup>th</sup> 2006)**

**1. General remarks**

The European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council document, December 2003) states: “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global player. It should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”.

It stipulates that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” and indeed, only together can the EU nations face today’s global challenges and generate the necessary power to promote and actively defend European values and interests. Only thus will the EU be able to influence the global agenda and the policies and behaviour of other international players. The EU should therefore define its interests as a basis for active and coherent policies.

This is why the EU must develop a genuine Union foreign policy taking account of the Union’s interests and objectives, the international situation and identified or foreseeable risks. More than just reacting to crises and threats, it is necessary to anticipate likely developments in the international situation and define the necessary strategies for dealing with them. This calls for the creation of appropriate unified European political and diplomatic structures, such as the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, a common diplomatic service, etc. and the means for an autonomous assessment of the international situation. At the same time we must ensure closest cooperation and linkage of the diplomatic services of member states among themselves and with the common EU structures.

The Union’s foreign policy must be backed up by a military capability so that the Union does not find itself incapable of taking action in certain situations: all external action including diplomatic and military action must be incorporated within a broad, comprehensive strategic concept.

**2. The ESS document**

These facts provide the basis for the ESS, which illustrates the EU’s ambition of becoming a global player. The document analyses global challenges and threats (terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, state failure and organised crime, immigration, energy, etc.) and defines the means for attaining the EU’s objective of defending its security: addressing the threats, building security in its neighbourhood by ensuring that it is surrounded by a ring of friendly countries and strengthening an international order based on effective multilateralism.

If we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. Being more active means that the EU and its member states must pursue European strategic objectives with determination. Being more coherent requires internal cohesion and the will to act in common. Being more capable means that the EU must develop and apply the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian activities, as well as policies on trade and development. We need to develop a strategic culture that encourages early, rapid and, where necessary, robust action.

Foreign and security policy, which the EU member states consider to be a major expression of their sovereignty, is developed within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation. Nevertheless, effective sovereignty, in the sense of real freedom of action, is very limited for individual member states, including for the bigger ones, which perceived on a global scale do not look as big as they may feel. By acting in common, Europe will be able to successfully

defend its values and interests. Internal cohesion, capabilities and the political will to act together are preconditions for effective international action as a global player. Up until now, the approach to security and defence was purely output-oriented. **Headline Goal 2003** forces were developed without defining what they were for and where they were going to be used.

### **3. Implementation of the ESS**

With the ESS the EU has taken an important step towards developing a genuine European concept and approach in the area of security policy. It is the first time that an EU document has identified security threats and risks and defined the EU's crisis-management and conflict-prevention concept, which includes a broad range of different instruments at the disposal of the Union and its member states to be used in a coherent way in order to address a crisis.

The ESS has the potential to develop into a major strategy in the traditional sense of the term, in other words setting out concrete action plans and policies and the necessary measures for their implementation.

The ESS is implemented through:

- a number of strategic documents, such as the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- the elaboration of global strategic partnerships, such as those with Russia (1999/2004), India (2004) and China (2003);
- the EU Strategy for Africa and
- the EU Neighbourhood Policy.

Joint Actions are a major means for translating the ESS objectives into reality and should be used for the further development of the ESDP.

### **4. European Security and Defence Policy**

A strategic European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is essential for the realisation of the ESS. The ESS should serve as both a political and conceptual guideline for the Union and its member states. Such a common European Security and Defence Policy calls for a clear distinction to be made between “security” and “defence.

- The aim of the Union's common security policy is to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security”
- the aim of the Union's common defence policy is to “safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity”.

Such a distinction between security and defence was clearly present in the deliberations and conclusions of the Convention and included in the **Treaty establishing** a Constitution for Europe signed in Rome on October 29<sup>th</sup> 2004 (Art. III-292).

**For this purpose the Convention** made also provisions for a specific type of cooperation **in the area of security and defence:**

- “Enhanced (structured) cooperation” among states prepared to participate in the more “demanding” Petersberg missions, in other words, crisis management and security operations;
- “Closer cooperation on mutual defence for countries which are prepared to assume these commitments.”

At the same time it is necessary to be aware that boundaries between security and defence missions are becoming more and more fluent. A military crisis management operation

projecting European power may also become a defence operation by developments in the theatre of operations leading to an attack on a participating partner country.

In order to be able to guarantee its own security and defence, Europe must first and foremost acquire structures and strengthen existing ones responsible for situation assessment and deciding, *planning* and conducting operations. It must also make available the required resources to them. Furthermore, on the basis of the different scenarios for deployment it must define the necessary system of forces and capabilities and the contribution that each member state must make to that system, avoiding both gaps and overlap by a system of cooperation, pooling of resources or specialisation in certain capabilities. Such a system would include not only the land, naval, air and Special Forces themselves, but also their whole environment, in terms of logistics, support, transport, intelligence, command (creation of a complete and permanent chain of command), control and communications.

The present organisation of European forces leads to a duplication of structures and capabilities of European forces. This makes the present European system of forces and capabilities costly and inefficient and makes it difficult to achieve the necessary high technical standards needed for force projection and for successful operations. Role specialisation requires guarantees that the capabilities of the partners are available when they are needed. As a first step towards a common system it is necessary to achieve greater interoperability of European forces and capabilities and develop common standards using NATO experience.

The recently-established European Defence Agency (EDA) has **in particular** a pivotal role in defining military requirements and planning and evaluating the necessary EU military capabilities, including the implementation of the battle group concept.

The missions resulting from the ESS document are veritable security missions. They entail the development of a broad range of civil and military instruments for the implementation of the ESDP, enabling the EU to carry out a broad range of missions over far greater distances, at potentially higher levels of conflict intensity and for longer periods. Military missions require the European armed forces to be able to operate progressively higher up the conflict intensity scale, from defence diplomacy at one end through to missions of combat forces in crisis management including peace enforcement.

An important element for the military implementation of such a concept is the adoption and implementation of the Headline Goal 2010.

The ESS has a major impact on the transformation processes required for implementation of that headline goal. Contrary to the public perception, the ESS serves in many countries as a guideline for restructuring the national armed forces.

For the purpose of developing a strategic concept, the ESS must be translated into security and defence missions in all relevant areas, military and non military that will henceforth form the basis for a strategic European Security and Defence Policy. In the military, a detailed military task list will in turn provide the framework for European forces transformation, European armed forces interoperability, the planning of future missions and equipment programmes and the definition of defence funding requirements. The EU should be in a position to undertake all ESS-type missions.

Within the EU, the EU's traditional voluntary "bottom-up" capability development approach continues to be applied. This approach is driven by what is available and not by what is necessary to make the EU's ambition a reality.

In addition, the role of the military within the EU itself, in such areas as disaster relief, dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks (solidarity clause), protecting critical infrastructure and dealing with "internal violence" remains to be defined. In the present

international security context the concept of separation of internal and external security cannot be maintained because the boundaries between external and internal security have become fluent.

In the framework of transatlantic relations, the ESS should provide an important tool for a strategic dialogue with the US. There is a broad consensus on the perception of threats, but there are marked differences in terms of strategic goals and policies. Europeans consider the strengthening of the international order on the basis of effective multilateralism and international law as their main strategic goal. As regards the use of military force, Europe does not share the US doctrine of pre-emptive military strikes **as defined in the National Security Strategy of the United States of 2002**. A strategic dialogue between EU and the US is essential, because each will have even more need of the other in the future.

A strategic partnership is being developed between the EU and NATO on the basis of equality between the two organisations, taking into consideration their different nature. That partnership takes the form of cooperation in the military field between the two players. Although the EU and NATO have concluded a number of important agreements, there is still a need to develop their relationship further in order to overcome existing problems and grey areas.

## **5. Recommendations:**

The objectives of the European Union's external policies and action have been defined in the Treaty of the European Union (Art. 11 para I Treaty of Nice) and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed in Rome on October 29<sup>th</sup> 2004 (Art. III-292). In accordance with these provisions, the European Union pursues the following policy objectives:

- safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
- consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
- foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
- help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
- assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
- promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

The Treaties also state that the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by principles which form its own value basis: democracy, rule of law, universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principle of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Foreign, Security and Defence Policy objectives formulated in the EU Treaty as well as in the ESS must be translated and implemented into common European strategies and policies by the European Union and its Member States. If the European Union wishes to set and influence the international policy agenda, it has to develop a coherent strategic policy based on the objectives and common interests of the European Union. It is therefore necessary to

define the common European interests keeping in mind that common European interests are not necessarily the sum of national interests of Member States of the European Union.

In order to develop a more strategic and operational ESDP, it is necessary:

1. To create an autonomous EU strategic planning and operational capability, in the form of a permanently staffed civil/military operations centre (HQ) working in conjunction with the EUMS. The present state of affairs – where the only choice is between SHAPE and a national headquarters – is not in keeping with the EU’s ambition of becoming a global player. It also limits the participation of smaller states, which have limited personnel resources. Such an *ad hoc* approach prevents the build-up of crisis-management expertise and the application of lessons learned.
2. To develop military and civil capabilities: the current efforts to develop the battle groups, the European Gendarmerie Force and pools of experts are encouraging. A European Humanitarian Operation Corps “EURHOC” as proposed by EuroDefense would fill the existing humanitarian gap in complex crisis-management operations.
3. To strengthen the Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM) and make better use of peer pressure in order to overcome the present voluntary bottom up approach to capability development.
4. To draw up new methods for the financing of military ESDP operations: the current principle of “the costs lie where they fall” is to some extent in contradiction with the principle of European solidarity. The Athena Mechanism for common costs needs to be extended and the financing of civil operations improved.
5. To proceed with European defence integration and the pooling of military capabilities within the ESDP.
6. To make full use of the potential of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and ensure that it has the necessary financial means to fulfil its tasks. **It is also essential to maintain and strengthen the necessary European Industrial Defence capacities.**
7. To develop a European defence research and technology strategy in order to maintain and expand Europe’s presence in the technology areas of the future, such as space, IT and high-tech weapon systems. **A special effort should also be made to develop non lethal weapons systems, to give better adapted tools to military and police forces to maintain security and order on the ground.** The Security Research Programme financed by the EU makes an artificial distinction between internal and external security that does not correspond to the strategic challenges and requirements. Both internal and external security measures are required in order to address the main threats. **There should be a continuous close link between the Security Research Programme of the Commission and the EDA Research Programme.**
8. To draw up strategies that are lacking, such as a European Defence and Homeland Strategy: from the military point of view the EU lacks a “Defence Strategy”. The “Long-term Vision Process” that has been initiated should contribute to defining military requirements with a view to the 2030 horizon. A homeland security strategy that links internal and external security is also lacking. The need for domestic security is increasing in step with the EU’s growing international engagement.
9. To draw up concepts for “preventive engagement” and “effective multilateralism”,
10. To design a comprehensive communications policy, including a stronger role for national parliaments, interparliamentarian cooperation and the European Parliament.
11. **The EU should be willing to permanently review the ESS and to update it when necessary.**