

# EURODÉFENSE UK CONFERENCE 2009

## “AWAY FROM THE AGE OF CERTAINTY”

9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> September 2009

61, Whitehall  
London SW1

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The Foreign and Commonwealth Office



The Ministry of Defence



THALES

## EURODÉFENSE UK CONFERENCE 2009

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### GENERAL

EuroDéfense UK held a conference at 61, Whitehall, London, from 9<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> September 2009, see annex “A” for the programme. Delegates were drawn from the academic, diplomatic, military and commercial community, plus EuroDéfense Association colleagues - see annex “B” for the list of European countries attending. A conference to discuss the risks, threats and challenges facing Europe as a whole and within the wider context of the global community was timely, happening as it did, early in a new administration in the United States (US) and in the light of: the hangover of 9/11, the elections in Germany, considerations of an election in the UK in 2010, which might result in a new party coming to power, France joining the military structure of NATO, Afghanistan, the global financial crisis, etc..

21<sup>st</sup> century threats - fuel, food and water supply, demographic predictions, the movement of populations, climate change, well funded and even state sponsored terrorism, piracy, WMD, cyber and other forms of asymmetric warfare - have created and will continue to create the necessity for different and wide ranging forms of response. Within the context of ever improving Europe/US relations, change for any, as yet unforeseen, threats must be addressed and understood, in order for an appropriate response to be applied.

Against this background, both the physical boundaries and those of European Union (EU) influence, continue to extend. The EU is more frequently, either through NATO or direct, requested to intervene in both Petersburg and war fighting situations. Europe has proved in recent years its ability, via both its civil capability and out of area military power, to contribute to and to succeed in what it has set out to achieve. Greater and more open collaboration in all spheres of defence of a more self confident EU is the key to a future which enhances capability and where necessary, the projection of power. Action in combating piracy off the Somalia coast and beyond has been successful. EU support of NATO in Afghanistan. by a large number of nations demonstrates, despite the caveat problem, that a co-ordinated response is achievable. Peace keeping in Africa via the UN is being seen as another success.

**NATO**

Europe's relationship with both NATO and the US is vital. The importance of relationships with other nations and in particular Russia, must not however be underestimated. Contending today, with a different form of war fighting, plus the expansion, structure, reach and thus the sphere of influence of NATO, indeed its changed role, requires continually to be addressed. NATO, with France back in the integrated military structure, now incorporates all major EU member states. Without being or being seen to be a surrogate for the US projection of power, the EU will continue to have a key role in NATO's future. A strong, effective European military input will balance and strengthen this relationship.

**US**

On both sides of the Atlantic, US/EU links are valued. The US believes, however, that the European military and NATO ought to work more closely together. A strong cohesive EU military will command the respect of the US. The US should and to a large extent does trust its relationship with Europe but the EU must be seen to deliver results. The US believes success in Afghanistan is vital to homeland - meaning both EU and US - security and to the future of the Western Alliance, thus is firmly committed to the operation. Somewhat suspicious of Russia the US believes, however, that resolution and trust, built to include the ties of a strong US/EU relationship, can be found.

**RUSSIA**

Russia sees itself, as an integral part of Europe but believes the West does not understand this. The Russians, with many post communist problems, are unsure and not a little frightened, questioning whether NATO, creeping eastward, offers the best option for European defence. It is however seen that Europeans value a peaceful engagement with Russia but both parties must demonstrate trust and confidence in the other. Vulnerability over a nuclear Iran is felt by Russia. A linked policy, with Europe taking a stronger role than heretofore, coupled to the US might provide an answer to a problem, which should continue to be explored.

**PR/PA**

Public Opinion and Public Affairs are simply not very good, especially in the area of defence. The media has a key role to play in putting across a balanced and if possible positive view of the involvement of national defence forces engaged in a particular operation, rather than picking only at the more unfortunate but necessary aspects of war fighting. How to make good this attitude when clearly bad news sells better than good news is a problem that must be addressed and if possible overcome.

**FINANCE**

The retention of European countries' skills bases is essential to the future health of national economies, let alone to the independence of weapons development. Unwelcome as it may be to some European nations, increased but co-ordinated expenditure in the fields of Research and Development (R&D), personnel and matériel, needs to be addressed. More must be spent on the European military and value for money, is still key.

## EURODÉFENSE CONFERENCE 2009

### “AWAY FROM THE AGE OF CERTAINTY”\

The President of EuroDéfense UK, Andrew Douglas-Bate MBE opened the conference by thanking the sponsors for their support. Without their generous contributions, both financial and in terms of advice the Conference just could not have been staged. He thanked the EuroDéfense UK team for their unflagging help throughout the promotion, planning and final mounting of the Conference. He also paid tribute to the speakers, who would be giving their time to travel to Whitehall, London to participate but above all he thanked the large audience present, who again would, by their presence over the next two days, be promoting their commitment to European defence.

### Opening Addresses

#### **Rt.Hon. David Milliband MP** **Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

The Conference was then addressed via a video link by **Rt.Hon. David Milliband MP**. He spoke of the timeliness of such discussions on the future of European security and the threats being faced. He focused on the need to work together where military solutions would not be sufficient in themselves. He believed that the time was right to analyse the strengths and weaknesses within Europe and to reflect on lessons learned previously in areas such as Kosovo. With regard to the Lisbon Treaty, he emphasised the need to ensure that when it comes into effect the totality of its impact was fully understood by all nations.

#### **Sir Bill Jeffrey KCB** **Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the UK Ministry of Defence**

**Sir Bill** again referred to the timeliness of such a Conference. 9/11 has changed the world forever. The contribution of European defence has grown significantly over recent years and Europe is more capable, now, of integrating military and civil contributions - the conflict in the Balkans is a prime example of such integration. Joint effort in Somalia is also a good example with the operation being led from Joint Headquarters, Northwood, Middlesex, UK. Operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Ache all demonstrate widespread and significant, co-ordinated responses.

Europe's relationship with NATO is the cornerstone of European security. A clear understanding of the respective roles and avoidance of duplication of effort is needed. Joint European capability is one answer. He suggested, that the cooperation of the US could be used as the catalyst to bring EU and NATO efforts together, particularly as the US recognises the need for a strong European community and both have to operate, on occasions, outside of their areas of experience.

The impact of the financial recession has yet to be fully understood and is likely to be worse than envisaged. He suggested that 2% of GDP should be spent on defence. Currently only the UK spends 2% of GDP on defence, followed by France at 1.58%. It should be noted that as cost increase, defence spending power tends, over time, to diminish. Referring to equipment and procurement, he raised the issue of how best to develop an intelligent approach to equipment procurement across Europe to maximise defence budgets. A focus on R&D will be to the benefit of all. The Defence and Security Procurement Directive, it is hoped will make a significant contribution. In this regard, he concluded that best value for money will be achieved when the European market really does become truly open and transparent.

In response to questions, the following points were noted:

- The EU spends more on defence than the rest of the world, less the US. It was unlikely that European nations will be willing further to increase their defence spending.
- The components of the collective European defence spending contribution is complex. Effective integration is important; Afghanistan was again cited as an example.
- The challenge is also to develop a deployable and effective civil capability.

## Session One: Risks, Threats and Challenges

### **Dr. Paul Cornish, Head of International Security Programme, Chatham House Carrington Professor of International Security**

There is a need both “to control and to anticipate”. Lead times are long and the subsequent penalties are high. Government should not be allowed to get things “almost” right. Armed Forces need to be prepared and this preparation also impacts on current operations. It should be clearly understood that potential adversaries, today and in the future, will use asymmetric options.

Old strategies struggled to meet the new, threats. The 21<sup>st</sup> century provides different challenges. For example, in the future -

- Europe could well become dependent on overseas supplies for 90% of its oil and 80% of its gas.
- The European population could become only 6% of the worldwide population,
- An ageing population will, as a percentage of population, reduce the numbers available to serve in Armed Forces.

An analysis of the “ownership” of such risks is important, effectively to deal with them. The Armed Forces are already overburdened, thus it is essential that future expectations and strategy are seriously considered.

### **Mr. Robert Cooper CMG, Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union**

Conflicts that other, worldwide, nations are involved in have great importance. Their impact can be felt by Europe and can create further, different threats. Two types of war were referred to:-

Industrial, ie Iran/Iraq

People – an intellectual understanding of these was vital

Europe is still living in a world that is not fully understood; complexity has increased because of the diversities involved. The Cold War required understanding and there was an intellectual challenge appropriately to respond to its threats. This clearly demonstrates the importance of cohesion. Force is still important but not on its own. Military and civilian capabilities are also vital, ie there should also be a stout political dimension.

**Rt.Hon. Geoff Hoon MP, Member of Group of Experts, NATO Security Concept Review and Former UK Secretary of State for Defence**

The future role of the EU is still evolving. US involvement in Europe has raised the question of them becoming the only nation willing to fight a war. Europe needs to work with the US but also to develop its own capabilities. Expenditure on defence needs to be more effective and the type of capabilities required needs to be better determined. Russia's unwillingness to engage with Europe is a grave concern that Europe must sooner rather later address.

**Gen. (Rtd) Francisco Jose Garcia de la Vega Former Chief of Staff, Spanish Air Force**

International systems will be unrecognisable by 2030. The adaptability of organisations was vital. Threats, in years to come, should be viewed as opportunities.

**Sir Robert Worcester KBE, Senior Advisor to Ipsos MORI**

The maintenance of positive Public Opinion is vital for Governments of all nations. As a subject, Public Opinion is not well understood. Opinions change. Attitudes change less. Values rarely change. Recognition that the public is basically selfish, ie an attitude of, "what is in it for me", is paramount. Surveys indicate the public mood. When for example, a survey was carried out in this country as to whether or not the public felt that NATO was essential, the stability of the value placed on UK Armed Forces was notable. At this time, September '09, 81% of the US public support the US-led involvement in Afghanistan. Governments need an understanding of Public Opinion and the public needs a clear message via accurate and timely survey.

In response to questions, the following points were noted:

- NATO is not enough on its own and needs to look beyond its geographical boundary. This could present difficulties for Russia.
- The overarching strategy to expand Europe, the EU and NATO was underway. However, dependent upon the issue under discussion at the time, other countries may need to be engaged, eg. the involvement of China in climate change talks. Future development of such a strategy needs to be at a national level.



- Europe is the only group of states where there is no one individual who can take a decision. This demonstrates that not only is there an intellectual challenge but also a lack of cohesion. Only two European countries have the ability to undertake large scale operations but at a different level, the contribution of some of the smaller countries is surely invaluable. Effort is needed to develop an understanding of the history behind certain issues and conflicts, ie the intellectual effort to understand the Cold War was exemplary. The same intellectual effort has now to be employed in order to understand the many problems of the Middle East.
- Media coverage has a role to play in portraying a more balanced view of the level of engagement of different nations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the European Security Strategy has not been properly communicated to the public which if it had been, would have assisted in delivering a clearer understanding.
- It is felt that the EU is unlikely ever to have a single, central fighting mechanism and that peacekeeping missions frequently change into something that requires a more robust response.

## **Session Two: Defence Budgets and Procurement in the current financial climate**

### **Mr. Gerald Howarth MP, Shadow Defence Minister**

Current conflicts bear little resemblance to previous ones. The risk of proliferation is high with respect to state-on-state wars, ie North Korea now engaged in nuclear testing. Russia, too, is reinvigorated and as such is more assertive and has at the moment an ever increasing military capability.

The aim to win “here and now”, without looking to future consequences, is damaging debate.

Budgets should be based on the likely threats and the capabilities required to mitigate such threats. The Conservative Party, if elected, would institute a security review to ascertain this. The preservation of skills is vital and exports will we trust be boosted. A capabilities review and a review of the acquisition process will run parallel with a strategic defence review.

The UK's influence in the world and its economic impact are vital. The UK can not afford not to be a global power. Our relationship with the US will however be damaged, were this country's world status to be diminished. Moreover it would take a long time to recover our position on the world stage, should such a situation arise. He made clear, that the British nation is supportive of the Armed Forces, as suggested by a poll referred to earlier in the conference.

A more efficient procurement system is needed in the UK, along with intelligent Integrated Project Teams (IPTs), simplicity, avoidance of the duplication of effort within industry and enhanced speed of the decision making process. He noted further, that collaboration could add to cost and result in delay.

With regard to Europe, NATO must remain as the cornerstone of Europe's defence. An EU Commission that could order member states to send forces into battle will not be welcome but all NATO members should contribute to the military effort. European NATO members' expenditure had been cut to 1.9% of GDP on average whereas US expenditure has remained steady. More men and materiel are universally required and this will mean a higher cash investment.

Bilateral talks, based on geographics, are beneficial. The Conservative Party will not make deals to win influence in Europe; rather, it will use force of argument to achieve its aims. The Party will also strenuously resist the surrender of further national sovereignty to Europe should it accede to power in the next UK election..

### **Mr. Doug Henderson MP, Chairman of the Defence Committee, WEU**

What constitutes the threat has not been agreed but Europe must remain prepared. Because today's threat is not known, timescales are very difficult to second guess. Choices need to be made over capabilities; he suggested that certain European nations could specialise in niche areas thus enabling a higher level of interoperability within Europe.

Potential state-on-state conflict cannot be ignored or avoided. An example would be takeover in say an Islamic state by a jihadist movement, with the subsequent takeover of their political system, leading to external conflict .

He agreed with the need to update the nuclear deterrent and that it would be difficult for NATO countries to meet the proposed 2% of GDP on defence.

**Mr. Alexander Nicholl, Director of Editorial, International Institute for Strategic Studies**

Any defence spending by a country must match its national ambitions, ie role, responsibilities, etc. Such a spend must not therefore be solely on the principle of a percentage of GDP.

UK defence capabilities are strong but matching these to national ambitions is difficult and is likely to get more so. Defence spending will inevitably be reduced in coming years as the political will is unlikely to remain. UK defence expenditure is, however, more efficient than other European countries but the procurement system needs to be more responsive as delays were commonplace.

He recommended persisting with inter-European collaboration and not relying on the US. He suggested that UK/French co-operation will enhance value for money within Europe. He also promoted the retention of R&D spending as the future economic health of the nation will be dependent on this.

**Maj.Gen. (Rtd) Alan Sharman CBE, EuroDéfense UK / Former Director General, Defence Manufacturers Association**

Pressure on procurement budgets will continue to get worse and value for money will continue to be key.

ITAR regulations could be beneficial to US companies based in Europe who will possibly seek ways to avoid having to follow ITAR rules.

It is imperative that the UK and European skills base is maintained. There is a fear, that collaboration might increase costs of Government purchases. The efficiency of the supply chain will, however, be beneficial to all parties, if industry is left to pull together without Government interference.

In response to questions, the following points were noted:

- Cross purchasing collaboration between European countries must be promoted.
- Today's equipment is a result of yesterday's R&D investment. Suppliers will source R&D funding from anywhere they can.
- The UK cannot become dependent for military equipment on the US. On the other hand co-operation within Europe depends on whether European countries are prepared to make the necessary R&D expenditure.

- With reference to sustaining the level of current operations in Afghanistan, the proportion of a country's Armed Forces to its size is one issue. The involvement of other European countries in Afghanistan whose proportion of Armed Forces may be the same but their involvement is less is another issue. Most countries have reserve forces.
- With regard to success in the operations in Afghanistan, it was noted that the goal should not be set too high. Police forces, overall security and infrastructure are all important elements for the future of Afghanistan and it must be noted that some European countries are contributing to these efforts rather than engaging their Forces in direct military action. In some instances, the background to this position is historical.
- The meaning and implications of coalition warfare need to be considered whilst recognising that it is essential.
- Large companies tend to be global thus the political issues raised are less visible in industry. Additionally, many British companies are owned by European companies and as such, the UK has the most open market in Europe.
- With regard to collaboration, national sovereignty issues can prejudice collaborative projects for which R&D is fundamental. It was stated that undertaking the process of collaboration at a component high level to move the process forward is a priority.

### **Session Three: The Trans-Atlantic Link – What path now?**

#### **Sir Francis Richards, Director of Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham**

The trans-Atlantic link is 60 years old. There has, however, often been a state of tension with the US. This has occurred for many reasons, including military, where the US has often felt that it has had to act alone without European support. On the other hand, the US recognises its European allies, as the best they have. China and other Asian countries have weakened general US influence such that they are now having to work more closely with these nations. We should today therefore be aware that the attention of the US has necessarily drifted towards the Far East and China.

Until 9/11, Europe and the US were on divergent courses. Post 9/11, it is recognised that the threat to US and to European security will evolve outside Europe.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused changes to the structure of NATO such that it is now operating in a war fighting role outside of Europe. NATO and its US allies have also moved to improve the scope and effectiveness of its activity into other areas, such as for example measures against piracy.

Turning to the UK “special relationship” with the US, this has always meant the sharing of intelligence information, including nuclear. The relationship has always looked more “special” from London than from Washington. The US has permanent interests not permanent friends and the links are always under scrutiny. The EU does however, enjoy a special place in US relations. To encourage this relationship with the US, both Europe and the UK must play their part in operations in Afghanistan. Military capability needs to be brought in line with requirements. Better preparation is required against hard and soft power and the UK should consider the country’s level of effort in terms of our worldwide diplomatic strength.

For the future NATO needs to be outward looking, if it is to remain useful. Also the public must be educated on the global response to global threats. The situation today thus presents an opportunity for NATO to become a globally relevant and powerful body.

### **Ambassador Kut Volker Former US Permanent Representative to NATO**

Europe and the US need to act together to face global challenges: thus the transatlantic link remains critical and NATO remains vital as the venue that brings the transatlantic community together. Both the US and Europe must demonstrate that they are committed to this link and prepared to work for it in order to face the challenges of the future. The overriding issue for the US is that it has to find ways to deliver results. The current administration wants its allies to work with it but if the results are not apparent, the US will go it alone. Europe should be aware of and acknowledge this position.

There are a number of serious challenges to the transatlantic community today. These include:

**Afghanistan:** the US believes success in Afghanistan is vital to regional security and to the security of all allies. Because of the need to deliver a positive result, the US proposes to increase her investment in Afghanistan. From a security perspective, for the US to lose in Afghanistan, because we fail to do what is necessary, will be catastrophic. Thus there must be and is a strong commitment to success. It is questionable, however, whether all European countries have such a commitment to “success,” rather than simply “doing their share” for NATO, in view of the fact that some are placing limits on the extent of engagement, i.e. caveats on active commitment. Yet a failure in Afghanistan would be a failure for NATO and the transatlantic community.

Russia: Europe is critically divided over Russia, which itself is in an assertive mode, seeking to extend its influence over its neighbours. Western Europe seeks engagement with Russia, if only for its oil and gas reserves. Central Europe, meanwhile, seeks protection. The US seeks co-operation from Russia on a global agenda, e.g. Iran. These three approaches to Russia must be merged into a common, balanced approach both to unite the trans-Atlantic community and best influence Russian behaviour.

New threats and challenges: the most likely challenges to the trans-Atlantic community include regional crises, cyber attacks, energy supply shut-offs and the consequences of failed states, e.g. Somalia. There is currently no agreement or ability for NATO to address these issues on its own. But if not NATO, who should? And what other forums unite Europe and the United States around these security issues?

The EU and its role: there is concern that some European countries prioritise their involvement in the EU over and above their dealings with NATO. And yet the US is a member of NATO but not of course the EU. We therefore have an immediate disconnect in how to put our efforts together to meet today's security challenges. Europeans should work in a more cohesive way within the EU, and yet still provide full support and solidarity as allies within NATO. An unfortunate example of what happens when such solidarity is lacking took place in dealing with piracy off the coast of Somalia. A handful of NATO allies, who are EU members, blocked NATO action for months in order to hold the space for a potential EU operation. Meanwhile, acts of piracy increased, hostages were taken, and in the end, the United Nations sought NATO assistance anyway - for escorting World Food Program convoys.

Resources: to achieve positive results, a higher level of investment in European defence capabilities is needed. For its part, the US has, post the cold war, invested heavily and adapted to new challenges. Sadly, it does not see its allies investing at the same level, and this again causes strains on solidarity and cohesiveness within the transatlantic community.

**Mr. Theodossis Georgiou, EuroDéfense Greece Former Chairman, Atlantic Treaty Association**

NATO has had an old fashioned approach to security. The public do not mind if it is the EU or NATO providing security and defence as long as they are safe. Effectiveness is therefore the most important criterion and this depends on political leadership, an efficient decision making process and resources that can be quickly mobilised for common action.

There are three basic priorities for Europe to guarantee that NATO plays an assertive role:

- a. Member States should define a common position over the future of NATO;
- b. A stronger EU/US strategic relationship must be built, with the US recognising that European defence policy decisions will, more and more, be made within a European framework. In this relationship, NATO is just one of the elements and not necessarily the dominant one;
- c. The ESDP - NATO relationship must not in any way be allowed to impede its development.

NATO involvement with the EU must include all Member States, all of whom must work together.

Public support is imperative as it provides the legitimacy which matters as much as power does. Public support also requires an educated public within the meaning that they understand the reasons for co-operation and the effect that it will have on them.

### **Maj.Gen. (Rtd) Peter Gilchrist, EuroDéfense UK**

Europe has not yet decided what it wants from the ESDP. Thus, it may be that Europe sends contrary messages to the US which can at best disturb and at worst unravel relations.

Where NATO Nations, for political or other reasons, cannot be involved in the hard end of delivering security in Afghanistan, it is important they support the NATO strategy by providing trainers and mentors for the Afghan National Security Forces. The only way for NATO Forces to leave Afghanistan is for the Afghans to be competent to take over both the military and security roles. Hearts and Minds are therefore just as important, if not more so, than war fighting and so there are roles for everyone.

NATO needs the US. European NATO Nations need to understand the importance of the US to NATO. There are elements in Europe who believe that we no longer need US support and likewise there are people in the US who believe reports, that Europe is not pulling its weight in NATO. NATO would fail without the US and rhetoric on both sides needs to take this seriously into account.

In response to questions, the following points were noted:

- > The remits of those involved under the EU or NATO commands are different and also the response under Article V of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, applicable to the EU, is more robust than that required of NATO under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949.
- > Sharing intelligence is not always successful and invariably causes problems because not all of it can be shared either in the EU or in NATO because of source issues.
- > Co-ordination of overall effort in Afghanistan is lacking. The UN should act as the co-ordinator in the first instance, not NATO, which does not have the legal right to get all members to agree to any particular course.
- > Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty promotes consultation. It should be noted that the US goes to great lengths to consult with NATO.
- > NATO should speak with one voice and the EU should be both an internal and an external player in security.
- > The creation of a single European NATO military headquarters is unlikely as many countries would be unwilling to give up the kudos that having an individual NATO HQ affords to them.
- > As capacity is currently an issue and to enhance available resources, NATO and EU operational centres could be co-located and there should be no duplicate HQ. NATO needs, however, to address the efficiency of any future investment structure.
- > As it was not a member of the EU, the United States involvement in Darfur was an example of how the US used the auspices of NATO to become engaged.
- > The US should trust its strong relationship with Europe, where there is full support.
- > With reference to wishes v. expectations, it was agreed that a strategic alliance should be struck - the wish. However, to deal with the challenges, the political content must be correct and this is unlikely to be resolved because the political will is not there - the expectation.
- > EuroDéfense should invite all EU countries to debate with them. (Note: It is the EuroDéfense hope that this will happen.)



## Session Four: Russia and European Security

### **Mr. Alexander Sternik, Counsellor, Russian Embassy**

Russia sees herself as an integral part of the European operation. She values co-operation with the EU and the US and shares issues on the global agenda. 35% of Russia's trade revenue is generated from Europe which is, therefore, an important strategic partner – a good example of such partnership is the interaction of Russia with Europe to combat piracy as well as co-operation on the border with Chad.

European security still needs to become collective. There is no room for complacency as there are unreliable regimes in the world. Weaknesses in the architecture of European security need to be addressed. To ensure security in the 1990's, Russia chose to modernise and update. There are different levels of security now which has led to difficulty for others to propose building openness in Europe.

NATO is a pillar on which European security is buttressed but Russia questions whether this is the best option. NATO can sometimes be unhelpful because old ideals still exist.

A European security pact would enforce political commitments to create a legally binding framework and Russia would like a common approach to conflict resolution.

Russia is seeking partners to remedy deficiencies in the hard security field but also wants to see tangible results. It has no hidden agenda and does not seek to undermine NATO; it would like a co-ordinated the approach.

If Europe is serious about addressing security, it needs to 'join forces' with Russia to bring about real change.

### **HE Dr. Werner Fasslabend, EuroDéfense Austria / former Austrian Minister of Defence**

Russia is a great power due to its land mass, enormous energy, raw material reserves and its military capability. However, it has deficiencies. Only 140 million people exist across its huge land mass, there is a weak infrastructure and a propensity for corruption. From a European standpoint, Russia is of enormous strategic interest and is of interest for co-operation.

Big mistakes were made in the 1990's which did not build any common trust. The war in Georgia was an influence in this regard and damaged everyone's perception. Co-operation is now needed between Europe, the US and Russia.

Europe needs Russia as much as Russia needs Europe. There is an interlinked situation, eg. energy, and it is unlikely that Russia will be able to develop its capabilities if this is not done against a backdrop of strong co-operation with Europe. Russia needs to develop its immediate neighbourhood, including the countries in between itself and mainland Europe.

An open dialogue is now needed with Russia with a clear partnership and clear principles. Mutual respect will be paramount.

**Gen. (Rtd) Jean Rannou, EuroDéfense France Former Chief of Staff,  
French Air Force**

Referring to co-operation, Russia and Europe need to demonstrate trust and create confidence in each other to progress relations. The current political leaders are facing a daily necessity for short term gains and Europeans are becoming global partners for Russia as well as for the US, China and others.

Russia needs to become more "European" in order to harmonise relations and this will be a difficult transition.

Because the ideals still exist in the minds of previously opposed nations, it is time to turn the page on the Cold War.

**Mr. Nick Watts EuroDéfense UK**

Shared history should not be ignored and every effort should be made to avoid the mistakes of the past. Whether Russia and Europe should look at national security in the same way is debatable.

NATO remains a geostrategic forum that addresses security concerns. Western Europe's reaction to the war in Georgia was interesting. In this regard, it should be noted that some European countries are tied to Russia for their energy supplies.

The way in which collective security is built should be based upon those who died in the World Wars and those who were persecuted during the Cold War.

In response to questions, the following points were noted:

- In order to achieve its ambitions of security, Europe needs Russia - equally Russia needs Europe. Russia, however, seems stifled by the need to re-establish its superpower status. Europe seeks restoration of an equilateral relationship between itself, the US and Russia in order to restore stability and prosperity. For Russia, however, strategic dialogue is a requirement not an option and increasing such dialogue is its aim in Europe.
- With reference to a European security pact, Russia sees dialogue with all European partners as the way forward rather than leaving negotiation to one organisation. The OECD could act as a possible conduit for such discussions albeit, lacking status and political clout. In order for meaningful dialogue over the threats and challenges facing nations, attempting to build mutual confidence, there is a case for them to be handled through a neutral country.
- The new threats posed since 9/11 create a core concern for all members of the north Atlantic region. They can be tackled within the UN Security Council but the infrastructure within a global framework fails or is missing. Global threats require co-ordination and mutual understanding.
- Russia's concern over NATO expansion is based on NATO's increasing area of jurisdiction and although the legitimacy of NATO is confined to its membership, it is trying to play a global role. Additionally, whether Baltic states joining the EU would feel more secure in doing so and whether they could trust EU countries not to influence their independence is another issue for Russia. These issues, it is clear, require careful management.
- On the subject of Iran's nuclear programme and Europe's reluctance to take more control, there is the fear that Russia would veto such action in the Security Council. Russia also seeks to resolve the issue, particularly as it contravenes the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Russia would feel the consequences of Iran's programme more keenly than Europe because of its geographical proximity. It is, therefore, a strategic issue for Russia, just as it is for Europe. However, Russia recognises the need for a sensitive approach to Iran. Russia would expect Iran to enter into talks. Thus the strategic vision within Russia is not different from that of its European partners - but their approach is different.

- The war in Georgia was more than just a test of Europe's resolve and it was noted with interest that the US would not enter into the conflict. The EU played a useful role in ending the war in a way that NATO and the US could not perhaps have managed. However, it was accepted that Russia's reaction was a knee-jerk one but that they had no far reaching plans to topple the Georgian government.

## Session Five: Europeans in action

### **Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, Commander of EU operation EUNAVFOR-Atalanta**

Operation Atalanta is the first maritime operation to be initiated under ESDP and has three strands - to protect World Food Programme and other vulnerable shipping, to deter and subject to suitable arrangements for prosecution being in place, to arrest pirates/armed robbers in the AOO. The Merchant Marine at the UN Security Council had encouraged military forces to take action and the first UNSCR on piracy was signed in June 2008. The EU decided that the threat to humanitarian aid and the risk to vulnerable shipping in the area was sufficiently high to merit a crises response and the idea of a naval force was hatched. Thus, the dramatically increased incidences of piracy in the Gulf of Aden brought about Operation Atalanta, currently a two year project with a Mandate until the end of December 2010.

Pirate groups operate in two main areas, the Gulf of Aden and, more recently, in the Somali Basin. The latter provides a greater problem and emerged as an operating area after the success of the operations in the Gulf of Aden as the pirate groups were forced to spread their nets a little further afield to maintain income generating raids

There is beneficial connectivity between all agencies involved, including NATO and Coalition Maritime Forces in addition to a host of other counter-piracy forces in the area. Liaison with the merchant community is also well developed. The common goal of delivering maritime security has led to the development of new forums for international cooperation and much closer relationships between Naval forces and the merchant marine. EU NAVFOR has established a Maritime Security Centre in Northwood providing copious advice on how to transit the area safely, advice tailored to tankers or yachts, container ships or cruise liners. Seven thousand companies are now registered. Operation Atalanta provides support to all Flag States and a significant number of Member States contribute to the operation in terms of ships, aircraft, infrastructure or personnel.

**Ambassador Guido Lenzi, Special Adviser Italian Government, Italy**

Any security discussions need to include a political element. Afghanistan should not represent the litmus test of EU capability. The European flag is flying further around the world than ever before. This visibly demonstrates the expanding influence of the European community. EU actions are neglected or dismissed by some nations but overall, the EU is considered effective. It is not, however, viewed as a strong enough political player - which causes difficulties.

The EU at its best, intervenes either before, as a facilitator or after a conflict, when acting in an authoritarian non military role.

Co-operation is the key to a greater EU presence in international activities.

**Lt.Gen. (Rtd) Jean-Paul Perruche, EuroDéfense France / former Director General of the European Union Military Staff**

**Achievements:** Operations should be conducted within a framework. The UN is not military so delegates an operation to a leading nation, except in some circumstances where a lead cannot be identified. Coalition forces have been used effectively in the Balkans, Kosovo, Iraq and in other operations, such as Operation Atalanta - referred to earlier.

**Lessons:** The EU needs to be requested to intervene. Europeans cannot lead big operations. New member countries appear divided and are in a weak position when the EU is divided. The ESDP has revealed some divisions. The EU has no influence over member states' defence budgets.

**Improvements:** The Lisbon Treaty could be an improvement. Ambivalence of some nations impacts on effectiveness. The security situation will require greater involvement of the EU in counter measures. The trans-Atlantic link, although vital, needs to be invigorated. Restrictions on European capabilities must be lifted. The EU should be able to discuss defence and security issues without detriment to NATO.

**Adm. (Rtd) Jörk Reschke EuroDéfense Germany**

Political efforts to restore and secure the safety of shipping around the Horn of Africa are, at this point, however, less effective than on the spot maritime intervention. The power and maritime strategy of the international community is however infinitely superior to that of the pirates.

In response to questions, the following points were noted:

- Referring to Operation Atalanta, good progress has been made in many aspects but the Operation suffers somewhat from a lack of air power due to the fact that air bases in East Africa are not available to support air coverage. Added to this, there are a number of flying restrictions in place in the area. There is only limited intelligence albeit the majority of pirates are opportunists rather than organised groups. International law is clear but weaknesses exist within individual nations to enact it. For example, prosecutions in Kenya and the Seychelles create friction with the EU state involved.
- The support of EU countries is valued by those engaged on the Operation. Many NATO processes are used which are a good example of the close relationship existing between NATO and the EU.
- On the question of a likely maritime attack by an organisation such as Al Qaeda, intelligence has revealed recommendations from Al Qaeda to take the battle to the sea. Terrorism in the Somalia area or Indian Ocean is however deemed unlikely. The threat is there but it is not visible at present.
- Feedback from the Operation to a nation that has provided materiel on what it is being used for, how it is performing, etc. would be appreciated to enhance future development.

The President and members of EuroDefense UK would like to thank the following for their generous support, without which the conference could not have taken place, in particular Thales UK for sponsoring the DSEI dinner on 10<sup>th</sup> September also the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence for sponsoring and co-hosting with EuroDéfense UK, the Fork Supper offered in the Locarno Suite on the 9<sup>th</sup> September. Our thanks go to:-

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Ministry of Defence

Thales UK

EADS UK

Finmeccanica UK

Andrew Douglas-Bate MBE

President EuroDéfense UK.

## The Programme

**EuroDéfense Conference 2009 – EuroDéfense Members' Programme****Wednesday, 9 September**

	Geological Society, Burlington House, Piccadilly		
14:30 - 16:00	<b>Presidents' Council</b> Room A	<b>EWG 13</b> Room B	<b>Internet Group</b> Room C
16:00 - 17:30	<b>PSC</b> Room A	<b>EWG 14</b> Room B	<b>EGW 11</b> Room C
18:30	Meet Royal Trafalgar Hotel foyer		
18:45	Depart for Foreign and Commonwealth Office by bus		
19:00 - 21:00	Fork Supper Reception, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, King Charles Street		
21:00	Return to Royal Trafalgar Hotel by bus		

**Thursday, 10 September**

8:00 Meet Royal Trafalgar Hotel foyer

8:15 Depart for 61 Whitehall by bus

8:30 - 9:00 Registration

9:00 - 9:30

**Opening of Conference**

- Andrew Douglas-Bate, MBE, President, EuroDéfense
- Sir Bill Jeffrey, KCB, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, UK Ministry of Defence
- Rt Hon. David Miliband MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Video address)

9:30 - 11:00

**Session One: Risks, threats and challenges****Speaker**

- Dr Paul Cornish, Head, International Security Programme, Chatham House & Carrington Professor of International Security

**Panel**

- Robert Cooper, CMG, Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
- General (Ret'd) Francisco Jose Garcia de la Vega, Former Chief of Staff, Spanish Air Force
- Rt Hon. Geoff Hoon, MP, Member of Group of Experts, NATO security concept review & former UK Secretary of State for Defence
- Sir Robert Worcester, KBE, Senior Advisor to Ipsos MORI

**Moderator**

- Sir Moray Stewart, KCB, DLitt, Vice President, EuroDéfense UK

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee break



11:30 - 13:00

**Session Two: Defence budgets and procurement in the current financial climate**

**Speaker**

- Gerald Howarth, MP, Shadow Defence Minister

**Panel**

- Doug Henderson, MP, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the WEU
- Alexander Nicoll, Director of Editorial, International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Major General (Ret'd) Alan Sharman – EuroDefense UK

**Moderator**

- Andrew Douglas-Bate, MBE, President, EuroDéfense UK

**Thursday, 10**

**September**

**contd:**

13:30	Depart for DSEi Exhibition
16:30	Depart from DSEi Exhibition
19:00	Meet Royal Trafalgar Hotel foyer
19:15	Depart for DSEi Dinner by bus
19:30 - 23:00	DSEi Dinner
23:00	Return to Royal Trafalgar Hotel by bus

**Friday 11 September 2009**

8:30 Meet Royal Trafalgar Hotel foyer

8:45 Depart for 61 Whitehall by bus

9:00 - 9:30 Coffee

9:30 - 11:00 **Session Three: The Trans-Atlantic link: What path now?**

**Speakers**

- Sir Francis Richards, Director of Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham
- Kurt Volker, former US Permanent Representative to NATO

**Panel**

- Theodosis Georgiou, EuroDéfense Greece & former Chairman Atlantic Treaty Association
- Major General (ret'd) Peter Gilchrist, EuroDefense UK

**Moderator**

- Captain (Ret'd) Gordon Wilson, RN, EuroDéfense UK

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee

11:30 - 13:00 **Session Four: Russia and European security**

**Speaker**

- Alexander Sternik, Councillor, Russian Embassy

**Panel**

- H.E. Dr Werner Fasslabend, EuroDéfense Austria & former Austrian Minister of Defence
- General (Ret'd) Jean Rannou, EuroDéfense France & former Chief of Staff, French Air Force
- Nick Watts – EuroDefense UK

**Moderator**

- Sir Moray Stewart, KCB, DLitt, Vice President, EuroDéfense UK

13:00 - 14:00 Sandwich Working Lunch

14:00 - 15:30

**Session Five: Europeans in action****Speaker**

- Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, Commander of EU operation EUNAVFOR-Atalanta

**Panel**

- Ambassador Guido Lenzi, Italy
- Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Jean-Paul Perruche, EuroDéfense France & former Director General of the European Union Military Staff
- Admiral (Ret'd) Jörk Reschke, EuroDéfense Germany

**Moderator**

- Colonel (Ret'd) Michael Rose, EuroDéfense UK

15:30	Formal conference ends
16:00 - 17:30	Presentations from Working Groups 13, 14, PSC and Internet
17:30	Return to Royal Trafalgar by bus
19:00	Meet Royal Trafalgar Hotel foyer
19:15	Depart for Army and Navy Club by bus
19:30 - 22:15	Reception and Dinner, Army and Navy Club
22:15	Return to Royal Trafalgar Hotel by bus

**Annex “B”**

Delegations from EuroDefense chapters in

- UK
- Austria
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Portugal
- Romania
- Spain

Also welcomed to participate were senior officials from Russia and the United States of America.

**Post Script.**

A most heartening situation arose during the Conference. On the afternoon of Thursday 10<sup>th</sup> September, EuroDéfense members and guests visited the DSEi Exhibition, at the National Exhibition Centre, Silvertown. At one point, while I was going round the exhibition I was approached by two Royal Marines, asking if I would contribute to a charity, in aid of Help the Heroes. I parted with some money and was presented with a wrist band, which as it happens I still wear. I suggested to the two Marines, that if they were to present themselves, in uniform the next morning at 61, Whitehall, SW1, I would, before the start of proceedings, give them three minutes each to explain to delegates, what Help for Heroes is about and then allow them a few more minutes to collect money for the charity, in exchange for wrist bands. At 08:45 hrs the next morning, I was greeted, on arrival at the conference by two extremely well turned out and keen looking Royal Marines.

Both Royal Marines gave of their best, from the podium, without recourse either to rehearsal or notes. They then passed through the auditorium with buckets to collect a little money for the charity and to hand out Help for Heroes wrist bands. They collected within the few minutes I gave them, £318. But more than this they spontaneously put across, to a very high calibre audience from all over Europe, why the British Military is held in such high regard.

I extend our grateful thanks to Marine Will Patten and Lance Corporal Darv Crisp.

A.S.D-B.