{"id":8602,"date":"2022-10-25T08:37:55","date_gmt":"2022-10-25T08:37:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eurodefense.pt\/?p=8602"},"modified":"2023-02-20T17:57:51","modified_gmt":"2023-02-20T17:57:51","slug":"legitimization-of-the-chinese-entry-in-the-arctic-whats-at-stake-and-why","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eurodefense.pt\/legitimization-of-the-chinese-entry-in-the-arctic-whats-at-stake-and-why\/","title":{"rendered":"Legitimization of the Chinese entry in the Arctic, what’s at stake and why?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the last 20 years, we have witnessed a conjectural change of power in the international system, where, nowadays, we witness a greater quest for power not only by one actor, but by several. The world as we know is in constant change, not only in the political panorama, but also in the economic and above all, in the technological panorama, whose changes profoundly influence the “hierarchy” of the international system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the regions that has gained more value and, at the same time, has remained somewhat out of the international media spotlight (for deliberate reasons or simply because something of greater relevance is happening) has been the Arctic area, which has been the target of increasing interest by the world’s major powers, both for the resources that the region holds and that may have the ability to change the world energy game, and as a means to influence other actors in the international scene<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of these interested powers is China, a country that is not in the Arctic Council because it does not have sovereignty over any area of the region, but that sees in the Arctic an opportunity to consolidate its influence around the globe, either from the energy resources it can obtain, or in the improvement of its trade routes, or in the exertion of influence from projects such as the “Polar Silk Road”, which will be addressed in this reflection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reflection aims to make us understand what Beijing’s interests are in the region, why they exist and how they can be materialized. It also aims to show what the western response has been and how effective China has been in its plans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is the Arctic Council?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In order to begin to explain how China can materialize its interests in the region, is important to know one of the most relevant actors that determines a lot of the policies that are applied in the Arctic. This organization is called \u201cThe Arctic Council\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Arctic Council is considered to be a high-level intergovernmental organization that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments. It was established in 1996 through the Ottawa Declaration, which all of its current members signed. The council counts as its members the States that possess sovereignty over lands within the Arctic and only those who meet this requirement can be members of it, with those being: The United States; Canada; Russia; the Kingdom of Denmark; Sweden; Iceland; Norway; and Finland. (Artic Council, s.d.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recently, the Council has drawn the its strategic plan for 2021-2030, where they set the strategic goals for the organization, with those being related to sustainable development in areas of economy, the environment and society. Although they don\u00b4t mention the importance of other actors than the ones that pretence to the Council, they do mention that they want to \u201cenhance constructive, balanced, and meaningful Observer<\/em> engagement and encourage their proactive engagement in relevant activities of the Council\u201d. (Artic Council, 2021) Which is relevant to China, since the country has an Observer status on the Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why does China want to get into the Arctic Council?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It’s not clear that China wants to get into the Arctic Council specifically, since as said before, the only countries that are eligible to be members of it are countries that possess sovereignty over lands within the Arctic. That doesn’t mean China doesn’t want to play a bigger role in the region. In fact, the former self called \u201cMiddle Kingdom\u201d already is somewhat of a constituent of the organization. As stated before, the country has a status of \u201cObserver<\/em>\u201d, which means that they can attend the meetings of the council, observe its work and purpose projects through an Arctic State, with the objection that the financial contribution for it cannot exceed the financing from Arctic States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Asian superpower, as stated by its government in 2018 in a document called \u201cChina’s Arctic Policy\u201d, sees itself as \u201ca near arctic-state\u201d (People\u00b4s Republic of China, 2018) and one of the continental states that are closer to the Arctic Circle. They also see themselves as an important stakeholder since the natural conditions of the region and their possible changes directly affect the country’s climate system and environment and subsequently its agriculture, fishery and economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The way China pretends to exert its influence is similar to how China has been behaving in other regions of the globe. With the implementation of investment projects in other countries. Similar to the \u201cBelt and Road Initiative, in 2018 it was introduced the \u201cPolar Silk Road\u201d (PSR), a project that aims to connect three major economic centres, North America, East Asia, and Western Europe, via the Arctic Circle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By reading the document with China’s Arctic Policy, we can split their strategy and reasons for why such interest in the region in 3 parts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n