Introduction
The Middle East is entering a new geopolitical phase, defined by shifting power balances, rising
regional actors and increasing competition among global powers. The gradual move away from the
United States toward a more fragmented and multipolar system has created both new opportunities for
regional autonomy and heightened instability. Together, economic initiatives, diplomatic realignments
and ongoing conflicts are reshaping the region’s landscape, with significant implications that extend
well beyond its borders.
In this evolving context, the European Union faces growing challenges in asserting itself as a coherent
and influential actor. While deeply affected by developments in the Middle East, particularly in terms
of energy security, migration and regional stability, internal divisions continue to define EU’s reactive
policymaking and dependence on external security guarantees. Caught between dependence on the US
and the need for strategic autonomy, will the EU be able to navigate the evolving Middle East order as
a credible geopolitical actor?
A Changing Middle East
The Middle East is going through profound transformations, shifting from a United States centric
order to a more multipolar system, in which regional middle powers are expanding their economic and
diplomatic influence while reducing their reliance on external actors. Saudi Arabia, in particular, is
emerging as a key diplomatic actor, exemplified by its role in hosting US talks with Russia in 2025.
Meanwhile, Turkey has emerged as an increasingly assertive regional force, expanding its influence in
the Levant and positioning itself also as both a political and diplomatic actor.
Simultaneously, the Middle East is re-emerging as a central arena in the growing rivalry among the
United States, China and Russia, each pursuing distinct strategies. While the US is increasingly
perceived as an inconsistent and less reliable partner, China has positioned itself as a long-term
alternative, expanding its influence through infrastructure, technology and partnerships in the region.
Beijing continues to avoid direct security involvement, as illustrated by its restrained response to the
Israel and Iran war in 2025, highlighting a cautious approach that prioritizes influence without
assuming the risks of military responsibility. Russia, for its part, still functions as a disruptive and
opportunistic actor that focuses on maintaining relevance and projecting power, rather than pursuing
regional stability.
Although these actors seek different objectives, their overlapping competition contributes to a
fragmented and volatile regional order, characterized less by fixed alliances and more by flexible
cooperation. Middle Eastern states are actively diversifying their partnerships to avoid dependence on
a single power, and increasingly turning to mini-lateral formats, small and flexible groupings, to
manage great power competition and preserve strategic autonomy. Initiatives such as the India-Middle
East-Europe Economic Corridor illustrate this broader shift toward a more adaptable cooperation.
Europe’s Strategic Weakness
Despite its economic weight and geographic proximity to the Middle East, the European Union
continues to struggle to translate its capabilities into coherent geopolitical influence. This limitation
comes from a reactive policy approach, persistent internal divisions and enduring dependence on the
United States for security.
The EU engagement in the region has largely been impulsive. European responses have typically been
shaped by crises rather than a longer term planning, as illustrated by the 2015 migration crisis and the
energy disruptions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In both cases, policies were designed
under pressure and with limited coordination, revealing the absence of a visionary, broader strategy.
This pattern persists in the current Middle Eastern context, where the Union has struggled to articulate
a clear and unified response to rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics, including the war involving
Iran. As a result, the EU risks being consistently positioned as a responder instead of a shaper of
regional developments.
Internal divisions among Member States also continue to undermine Brussels’ external effectiveness
and complicate the formation of a common foreign policy, as seen in the Israel and Hamas conflict,
where European states adopted varying positions weakening their diplomatic coherence and
credibility. Such fragmentation not only limits the EU’s ability to act decisively but also exposes it to
external pressure, as third powers can exploit these divisions to advance their own interests.
Finally, Europe’s dependence on the United States for security remains a central constraint on its
autonomy. While the transatlantic alliance continues to provide essential military capabilities, it also
restricts the EU’s room for independent action. The recent US decision to engage militarily with Iran
without consulting European allies highlights the asymmetry in the relationship. This dependence is
further reinforced through NATO, which, despite its importance, anchors European security within a
US framework. Consequently, Europe is often compelled to adapt to US strategic choices, even when
they conflict with its own interests or priorities.
These structural weaknesses leave the European Union in a fragile position at a time when the Middle
East is becoming increasingly central to global power competition. Without addressing its impulsive
posture, internal fragmentation and security dependence, the EU will struggle to assert itself as an
autonomous actor capable of navigating the region’s evolving balance of power.
IMEC, Energy and the Limits of European Strategy
A key example of the European Union’s attempt to translate economic influence into geopolitical
strategy is India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Back in September 2023, during
the G20 Summit in New Delhi, this major initiative aimed at linking India, the Gulf and Europe was
presented as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Built around an
integrated system of transport, energy and digital infrastructure, it was designed to strengthen
connectivity across the three regions.
It aims to improve supply-chain resilience, reduce shipping times and deepen economic
interdependence between emerging and established economies. The plan is to build two routes: the
Eastern Corridor, connecting India to the Gulf through maritime and rail networks via the UAE and
Saudi Arabia, and the Northern Corridor, linking Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Israel to European
ports.
In spite of being a promising project, IMEC stands as a long-term vision instead of a concrete plan,
with its inconsistent progress likely to take over a decade. There are financial obstacles and
profitability doubts because of the region’s unstable business environment. Additionally, regulatory
differences between countries create further complications and require coordination, while the
exclusion of important regional actors limits its inclusiveness. The biggest challenge, however, is the
complex geopolitical environment, as the ongoing instability in the Gulf has prevented the
development of the Northern Corridor. Moreover, the US and Israeli strikes on Iran severely disrupted
regional trade, particularly gas and oil through the Strait of Hormuz. In an already fragile context,
these developments significantly reduce the short term feasibility of any project related to the corridor.
Beyond its logistical dimension, IMEC reveals the structural limits of the European Union’s role in a
rapidly evolving regional order. While the project reflects Europe’s capacity to mobilize economic
resources and foster connectivity, it also exposes its difficulty in operating as a coherent actor in a
contested geopolitical environment. External instability and internal fragmentation continue to limit
the EU’s ability to act collectively. As such, IMEC is not only a connectivity initiative, but also a test
of Europe’s capacity to move beyond a primarily economic role and engage more effectively in
geopolitical competition. Without stronger internal coordination and a clearer strategic vision, the EU
risks remaining a secondary player in projects that it helps to finance but struggles to shape.
The Iran War as a Wake-up Call
Serving as a geopolitical bridge between regions and a key transit space for trade and energy flows,
what is happening in Iran has a direct international impact. The US and Israeli attacks initiated on 28
February 2026 against the Iranian government marked the beginning of what appears to be a
long-lasting and profound war. Both states targeted Iran’s missile infrastructure, military sites,
leadership structures and areas linked to its nuclear programme and energy sector. In response, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard carried out retaliatory strikes against Israeli government and military
targets, also hitting countries hosting US bases and its allies, further destabilizing the region.
The war is already reshaping Europe’s security and economic outlook. The Iranian drone strike on a
UK base in Cyprus, NATO missile interceptions over Turkey, and growing concerns over terrorism
and migration pressures illustrate the direct spread of the conflict into European security space.
Despite the geographical distance, the economic repercussions were immediate, particularly through
Europe’s exposure to energy insecurity. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have driven up gas prices,
raised the prospect of fuel shortages, and increased costs across multiple sectors. Inflation is rising,
while slower economic growth is expected, and migration pressures intensifying threaten to worsen
political instability in Europe. At the same time, the conflict is indirectly strengthening actors such as
Russia, which benefits from shifts in US priorities and resources.
This conflict is now the second major crisis in the transatlantic relationship this year. Following the
Greenland crunch, Europe learned to push back more effectively against the United States, showing
that unity and economic leverage can compel Washington to reconsider its actions. This episode is
shaping the member states’ response to the Iran war, as after initial hesitation, European governments
adopted a firmer stance, distancing themselves from US policy and emphasizing that the conflict is
not theirs.
Between Dependence and Autonomy
Europe’s leverage in the Middle East remains primarily economic and political, rooted in its role as a
trade partner, its influence on market dynamics and capacity to shape international public opinion.
While it retains limited indirect military influence through logistical hubs and cooperation frameworks
such as NATO, its strategic autonomy is still constrained by continued dependence on the United
States, even as it seeks to develop more independent initiatives.
Although tensions within the transatlantic relationship have intensified, they continue to be shaped by
mutual dependence and institutional limitations on disengagement. In this context, Europe’s ability to
act effectively depends on maintaining internal unity, despite persistent divergences among member
states and external pressure from Washington. If sustained, such cohesion could enhance the EU’s
strategic coherence and reinforce its global position.
In parallel, Europe’s credibility is increasingly under scrutiny. Its role as a defender of international
law, combined with rising domestic sensitivity to defence commitments, places clear limits on its
margin of manoeuvre. Any inconsistency risks weakening its external legitimacy, while excessive
alignment or dependence on the United States could reinforce perceptions of weakness.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the European Union cannot persist as a passive observer of developments in the Middle
East. The evolving regional order is already shaping its security, economic stability and global
influence. The EU’s ability to balance dependence on the United States with a more selective form of
strategic autonomy will determine whether it emerges as a credible geopolitical actor or remains
constrained within a system shaped by others. The Iranian conflict and the Greenland crisis should be
understood not as isolated disruptions, but as manifestations of a broader structural transformation in
the international system. The European Union must move beyond reactive crisis management toward
a more prospective strategy, one capable of adapting to a fragmented and competitive geopolitical
landscape.
Lisbon, April 17th 2026
Leonor Biscaia da Costa Gonçalves
EuroDefense-Jovem Portugal
References
Besch, S. (2026, January). The Greenland episode must be a lesson for Europe and NATO. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/01/greenland-trump-europe-nato-fallout-davos
Besch, S. (2026, April). Europe cannot sit out the Iran war. Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/04/europe-iran-war-diplomacy-united-states
BBC News. (2026, April). Why did US and Israel attack Iran and how long could the war last?
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2dyz6p3weo
Colchester, M., & Pancevski, B. (2026, March). Europe is quietly playing a crucial role in the Iran
war. The Wall Street Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-quietly-playing-a-crucial-role-in-the-iran-war-aad34a00
Council on Foreign Relations. Atlantic Council. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor:
Connectivity in an era of geopolitical uncertainty.
European Council on Foreign Relations. (2024). The infinite connection: How to make the
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor happen.
Fix, L., & Bader, L. (2026, April). Europe has leverage in the Iran war. It should use it. Council on
Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/articles/europe-has-leverage-in-the-iran-war-it-should-use-it
Ghanem, D., & Sánchez-Cacicedo, A. (2024, June). From hype to horizon: What the EU needs to
know to bring IMEC to life. European Union Institute for Security Studies.
https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/hype-horizon-what-eu-needs-know-bring-imec-life
Goulard, S. (2026, March). The war in Iran and the revival of the IMEC.Global Connectivities.
https://globalconnectivities.com/2026/03/war-iran-imec/
Hefele, P., & Afterman, G. (2025, August). Rethinking Europe’s Middle East strategy in a changing
world. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024, October). The GCC in a multipolar world:
Navigating rivalries and building alliances.
Jack, V. (2026, March). Europe hardens opposition to Trump’s Iran war demands. Politico.
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-hardens-opposition-trump-iran-war-demands/
Neubert, K. (2025, October). Public support for EU defence spending past its peak, says poll.
Euractiv.
https://www.euractiv.com/news/public-support-for-eu-defence-spending-past-its-peak-says-poll/
Teo, S. (2024, December). The rise and endurance of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific. Lowy Institute.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-endurance-minilaterals-indo-pacific
