The February 2022 Russian attack unveiled the European Union’s structural weaknesses and underlined the urgency for reform. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely considered the most significant turning point in European security strategy since the end of the Cold War. With an emerging threat now pressing at its borders, the EU’s chronic problem, the lack of strategic autonomy, needs to be acknowledged through stronger and more coordinated defense investments. This new reality raises a curious paradox: can the EU be a peace project while simultaneously evolving into a geopolitical and defence actor?
Unifying Europe had long been a distant ideal, but it became both desirable and achievable in 1945, after the devastation of the two World Wars. The widespread “never again” sentiment corroborated the political will for new forms of cooperation and opened the door to new institutional experimentation. The founders envisioned a limited cooperation framework, based on preventing conflict, establishing a common market and creating a customs union, but this project soon turned into the most extensive example of states cooperation of the past 500 years.
As the decades progressed, the European strategy deepened with new initiatives such as the Single Market, the Schengen Agreement, successive enlargement and the creation of the euro. These measures helped build a more cohesive political and economic structure, while also expanding functional and geographical cooperation. At the institutional level, reforms facilitated the political decision process, the European Parliament grew significantly, and the European Court of Justice gradually extended the influence and application of EU law throughout its members. As a result, the EU authority has grown to integrate nearly every economic and social domain of the twenty-seven nations.
Since the Lisbon Treaty was ratified in 2009, the EU has struggled to pursue the kind of major treaty reforms that once shaped its development. Earlier crises typically pushed European leaders to formally amend the constitutional framing, expanding its powers through clear legal and democratic procedures. But recent challenges have been met with improvised solutions that operate in a legally ambiguous and temporary way, deliberately avoiding the political risks of public debate and ratification. The founding generations of European integration were motivated to make political innovation and were willing to take risks and reach ambitious, cooperative solutions. Today’s leaders, however, lack personal memories of war times or of Europe before open borders, and the emotional and historical reference points that once stabilised the European project.
Ukraine’s invasion triggered a decisive European response against Putin’s regime aggression. Forgetful to the concept of war on the continent, the attack exposed the dangers of comfort and marked the return of geopolitics to Europe. The shock of the conflict strengthened solidarity among the often divided states, and helped revive a sense of shared European identity. It ultimately created a major turning point in Europe’s security landscape, as Germany shifted toward a more active defence posture, abandoning its traditionally “civilian” strategy, and Finland and Sweden quickly joined NATO. Among others, these changes would have been politically impossible a few years ago, and suddenly became feasible under the new reality. European states have managed a collective response to Russia’s invasion, offering diplomatic backing to Kyiv and condemning the aggression as a threat to global peace. Because Ukraine is not a NATO member, Europeans have been avoiding direct confrontation with Russia, yet increasing their own defence spending and providing military, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
NATO, under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has been central to coordinating the Western response, reflecting Europe’s continued reliance on transatlantic security. Nonetheless, this dependence highlights a persistent vulnerability, Europe’s strategic autonomy remains limited. The EU’s fragmented defence structures and low investment in military capacity have highlighted the need for greater strategic autonomy and a more cohesive European defence posture. The new Trump administration has shown increasingly polarized commitment to European security. Even its most updated National Security Strategy (NSS), released on the 4th of December 2025, reads less as a foreign policy blueprint and more as a post Cold War statement. Typically published at the start of a new presidential term, the NSS sets out the administration’s key foreign and security policy objectives. This version suggests that Washington wants to retain global influence but is increasingly unwilling to shoulder the political, economic and security responsibilities that maintain hegemony. The ambiguity is most visible in its approach to Europe, portraying EU states as experiencing “civilizational decline”, while simultaneously demanding more contribution from NATO allies and questioning their reliability. Combined with calls for greater European defence spending and a pragmatic distancing from the war in Ukraine, the strategy reflects a gradual American withdrawal from structured global leadership at the very moment Europe faces its greatest security challenge in decades.
The return of war to Europe emphasizes the Union’s need to develop capacities to defend itself against Russia, with or without the United States. With no clear end in sight to Russia’s war against Ukraine, armaments and defence capacity have become central strategic concerns. Failing to deter Russia or to sustain adequate support for Ukraine would leave Europe at a serious disadvantage for decades. Nevertheless, its ability to mobilise defence spending quickly and maintain it over time remains limited. European defence budgets have increased since the invasion, but decades of underinvestment have left production capacities weak and few military stock. Since 2022, investment in defence equipment has risen significantly, but in 2024 eight NATO countries still failed to meet the alliance’s minimum target of 2% of GDP in defence spending.
Additionally, significant disagreements persist among EU states, with national governments often colliding against EU institutions. While countries bordering Russia prioritise strengthening security in the east, southern members argue for a broader definition of threats, including hybrid warfare, international terrorism and cyberattacks. Because the members often prioritise their national security interests and perceive other European states as competitors rather than partners, EU defense policy is inefficient and divided. Since the launch of new instruments such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017, Europe’s defence industry has expanded but the rise in production has been primarily directed to exports rather than to improve Europe’s own defence system. Export growth has surpassed production growth, underlining how dependent European manufacturers remain on foreign buyers. Meanwhile, European armed forces continue to import much of their critical equipment from abroad, particularly from the United States, South Korea and Japan.
As competitive national interests prevail, the fragmentation is further reflected in the wide range of military equipment, including multiple main battle tank models and different tactical combat aircraft that could, in theory, be replaced by standard platforms. Developing parallel systems across Europe wastes resources and drives unnecessary costs, but because the EU’s founding security and defence have largely been the responsibility of individual member states, a national focus has shaped the way each country organizes its defence sector. France’s state, for example, is responsible for the defence industry, while Germany relies entirely on private companies. Over time, these different systems have produced a defence landscape that is duplicative and often counterproductive. Moreover, because European governments typically buy war equipment in relatively small quantities, defence businesses are unlikely to invest in expanding production due to dependence on large and predictable orders. Each EU member state orders separately, often with slightly different technical standards or nationally tailored requirements, resulting in low production volumes and high unit costs.
In response to rising security risks and shifting geopolitical dynamics, the European Union has taken significant steps to strengthen its defense capabilities and advance strategic autonomy. Central to this effort is the “Readiness 2030” initiative, also known as the “Rearm Europe Plan”, launched in March 2025. The plan seeks to mobilize 800€ billion through coordinated national and European mechanisms. Member states remain the main contributors, supported by increased fiscal flexibility that allows higher defence spending. This effort is complemented by a 150€ billion instrument for joint procurement, limited reallocation of EU funds to defence infrastructure, expanded European Investment Bank support and the mobilisation of private capital through the Savings and Investments Union. This project builds on the European Commission’s ongoing efforts to organise and coordinate defence and security policy at the European level, beyond individual national efforts.
The initiative reflects the EU’s determination to reduce dependence on external military assistance: it targets seven critical capability domains to address current operational deficiencies, and emphasizes collaborative investment in missile defense systems and advanced air defenses. Yet, the path to strategic autonomy faces significant obstacles as Europe’s defense industry remains fragmented, heavily relying on foreign suppliers and full of structural holes. Although it has begun identifying critical supply chains requiring protection and aims for at least 50% of military spending to come from European enterprises by 2030, the progress is slowed by duplicate systems, outdated platforms and inefficiencies in key areas such as fighter jets and missile development. Furthermore, individual member states’ security investments still vary widely, while high-tech capabilities in missile defense, artificial intelligence and satellite intelligence fall behind strategic requirements.
This plan sets a guiding shift toward unilateral capability, balancing openness with the need for strategic independence in an era of geopolitical tension. However, the drive toward greater defence integration also exposes a central tension in the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy: while industrial and military coordination is accelerating, the political and moral governance of Europe’s defence stand has not kept pace. Previous EU and national defence initiatives have often increased pressure to export military equipment to third countries, reinforcing an export logic that does little to address Europe’s own capability gaps. These concerns are amplified by the weak and uneven enforcement of EU arms export rules. Although the EU Common Position on arms exports has provided binding criteria since 2008, member states continue to interpret and apply them inconsistently.
The consequences of this governance gap become particularly visible at the national level. Germany’s suspension of arms export to Saudi Arabia, following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, was motivated by human rights concerns but the decision disturbed joint Franco-German defence projects and spare parts deliveries. It ultimately led to Germany allowing France to export weapons containing German components, despite its own export suspension. This episode highlights the structural divisions in European defence cooperation, due to the lack of a common EU framework for arms exports to third countries. None of the existing defence cooperation instruments includes binding rules for joint export management, and the defence sector remains excluded from the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. As a result, industrial integration has advanced more rapidly than political accountability. Similar trends are visible at the national level, where increased political support for the defence industry has not been matched by stronger export controls, raising concerns that strategic considerations may increasingly outweigh human rights and rule of law principles.
Europe stands at a crossroads. The war in Ukraine has reminded the continent that peace is neither automatic nor guaranteed. The Union’s long term survival now depends on its ability to defend itself against external threats and to sustain credible military capabilities. Without it, the EU risks strategic vulnerability, being unable to protect its citizens, and advocate the values that have defined it for decades. The “Readiness 2030” is a bold initiative, aimed to modernize Europe’s defenses through coordinated procurement, investment in critical technologies and industrial capacity building, while recognizing the necessity of strategic unity in an unpredictable global landscape. Yet, autonomy cannot rest on industrial integration alone, it also demands political coherence and credible governance, particularly in sensitive areas such as arms exports, where common rules are necessary to conciliate security objectives with ethical and legal responsibilities.
The transformation of the European Union from a predominantly normative power into a credible security actor does not mark a departure from its identity as a peace project. On the contrary, in an era of geopolitical confrontation, peace can no longer be assumed, it must be actively protected. Whether the EU can meet this challenge will depend on its ability to remain united, to align strategic ambition with political accountability and to translate a crisis into lasting integration.
Lisbon, December 19th 2025
Leonor Biscaia Gonçalves
EuroDefense-Jovem Portugal
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